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The Onset of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis 
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs 
Yet it is also true that small events at times have large 
consequences, that there are such things as chain reactions 
and cumulative forces. It happens that a liquidity crisis in a 
unit fractional reserve banking system is precisely the kind of 
event that can trigger-and often has triggered-a chain 
reaction. And economic collapse often has the character of 
a cumulative process. Let it go beyond a certain point, and 
it will tend for a time to gain strength from its own 
development as its effects spread and return to intensify the 
process of collapse. Because no great strength would be 
required to hold back the rock that starts a landslide, it does 
not follow that the landslide will not be of major proportions. 
-Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 
4.1 Introduction 
The East Asian financial crisis is remarkable in several ways. The crisis 
hlt the most rapidly growing economies in the world and prompted the 
largest financial bailouts in history. It is the sharpest financial crisis to hit 
the developing world since the 1982 debt crisis. It is the least anticipated 
financial crisis in years. Few observers gave much chance in early 1997 
that East Asian growth would suddenly collapse.' The search is on for 
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1. Yung-Chul Park (1996) is a notable exception, but voices such as his were rare and 
generally went unheeded. Paul Krugman's (1994) provocative critique of East Asian growth 
suggested a slowdown in growth, not a collapse, a point that Krugman himself made clear 
in the fall of 1997. at the start of the financial crisis. 
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culprits within Asia--corrupt and mismanaged banking systems, lack of 
transparency in corporate governance, the shortcomings of state-managed 
capitalism. At least as much attention, if not more, should be focused on 
the international financial system. The crisis is a testament to the short- 
comings of the international capital markets and their vulnerability to sud- 
den reversals of market confidence. The crisis has also raised serious 
doubts about the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) approach to 
managing financial disturbances originating in private financial markets. 
Perhaps most important, the turmoil demonstrates how policy missteps 
and hasty reactions by governments, the international community, and 
market participants can turn a moderate adjustment into a financial panic 
and a deep crisis. 
One ironic similarity between the Mexican (1995) and Korean (1997) 
crises is that both countries joined the OECD on the eve of their financial 
catastrophes. There is a hint of explanation in that bizarre fact. Both coun- 
tries collapsed after a prolonged period of market euphoria. In the case 
of Mexico, a high-quality technocratic team had led the country through 
stabilization, privatization, liberalization, and even free trade with the 
United States. Indeed, the supposed cornerstone of Mexico’s coming 
boom was admission to the North American Free Trade Agreement which 
occurred in November 1993, just months before the collapse. In Korea, a 
generation-long success story of industrial policy and export-led growth 
had culminated in Korea’s admission to the exclusive club of advanced 
economies. Korea had even succeeded in democratization without jeop- 
ardy to its enviable growth record. In both countries, collapse came not 
mainly because of a prolonged darkening economic horizon but because 
of a euphoric inflow of capital that could not be sustained.2 
In this sense, the Asian crisis can be understood as a “crisis of success,” 
caused by a boom of international lending followed by a sudden with- 
drawal of funds. At the core of the Asian crisis were large-scale foreign 
capital inflows into financial systems that became vulnerable to panic. 
However, this is more than the bursting of an unwanted bubble (cf. Krug- 
man 1998). Much of the economic activity supported by the capital in- 
flows was highly productive, and the loss of economic activity resulting 
from the sudden and enormous reversal in capital flows has been enor- 
mous. There were few, if any, expectations of a sudden break in capital 
flows. By early 1997, markets expected a slowdown-even a devaluation 
crisis-in Thailand, but not in the rest of Asia. Indicators as late as the 
third quarter of 1997 did not suggest a financial meltdown of the sort 
2. A member of the Bundesbank board has reported to us his own discussions with Ger- 
man banks. He asked these banks why they extended such large loans to Korea in 1997, just 
on the verge of the financial collapse. Several banks replied that Korea’s new membership in 
the OECD had given them confidence that Korean economic performance would continue 
to be strong (private communication, February 1997). 
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that subsequently occurred. A combination of panic on the part of the 
international investment community, policy mistakes at the onset of the 
crisis by Asian governments, and poorly designed international rescue 
programs have led to a much deeper fall in (otherwise viable) output than 
was either necessary or inevitable. 
This paper, originally written in early 1998, provides an early diagnosis 
of the financial crisis in Asia. It builds on existing theories and focuses on 
the empirical record in the lead-up to the crisis. The main goal is to 
emphasize the role of financial panic as an essential element of the Asian 
crisis. To be sure, significant underlying problems beset the Asian econo- 
mies, at both a macroeconomic and a microeconomic level (especially 
within the financial sector). But these imbalances were not severe enough 
to warrant a financial crisis of the magnitude that took place in the latter 
half of 1997. In our view, certain policy choices and events along the way 
exacerbated the panic and unnecessarily deepened the crisis. We explore 
this possibility by examining the initial imbalances and weaknesses, the 
build-up to the crisis, and the events that led to the financial panic in the 
latter part of the year. The paper covers the period only till the end of 
1997, and it does not aim to provide policy recommendations for the fu- 
ture, either regarding the Asian crisis or the reorganization of the interna- 
tional financial system to reduce the likelihood of such crises in the future. 
These goals are left for a companion study (Radelet and Sachs 1998). 
The argument proceeds in six sections. In section 4.2 we provide a gen- 
eral overview of financial crises and their diagnosis. Section 4.3 gives a 
description of recent macroeconomic and financial events in the crisis 
countries. In section 4.4 we show that the crisis was not anticipated by key 
market participants, at least till the end of 1996, and in general not until 
mid-1997, following the devaluation of the Thai baht. Section 4.5 de- 
scribes the triggering events of the crisis. Section 4.6 discusses, and cri- 
tiques, the early IMF role in policy management in the Asian crisis (up to 
December 1997). Section 4.7, the concluding section, offers some observa- 
tions about future directions of research. 
4.2 Diagnosing Financial Crises 
Not all financial crises are alike, even though superficial appearances 
may deceive. Only a close historical analysis, guided by theory, can disen- 
tangle the key features of any particular financial crisis, including the 
Asian crisis. We identify five main types of financial crises, which may in 
fact be intertwined in any particular historical episode. 
1. Macroeconomic Policy-Induced Crisis. Following the canonical Krug- 
man (1 979) model, a balance-of-payments crisis (currency depreciation, 
loss of foreign exchange reserves, collapse of a pegged exchange rate) 
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arises when domestic credit expansion by the central bank is inconsistent 
with the pegged exchange rate. Often, as in the Krugman model, the credit 
expansion results from the monetization of budget deficits. Foreign ex- 
change reserves fall gradually until the central bank is vulnerable to a 
sudden run, which exhausts the remaining reserves and pushes the econ- 
omy to a floating rate. 
2. Financial Panic. Following the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of a 
bank run, a financial panic is a case of multiple equilibria in the financial 
markets. A panic is an adverse equilibrium outcome in which short-term 
creditors suddenly withdraw their loans from a solvent borrower. In gen- 
eral terms, a panic can occur when three conditions hold: short-term debts 
exceed short-term assets, no single private market creditor is large enough 
to supply all of the credits necessary to pay off existing short-term debts, 
and there is no lender of last resort. In this case, it becomes rational for 
each creditor to withdraw its credits if the other creditors are also fleeing 
from the borrower, even though each creditor would also be prepared to 
lend if the other creditors were to do the same. The panic may result in 
large economic losses (premature suspension of investment projects, liqui- 
dation of the borrower, creditor grab race, etc.). 
3. Bubble Collapse. Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and others, a 
stochastic financial bubble occurs when speculators purchase a financial 
asset at a price above its fundamental value in the expectation of a subse- 
quent capital gain. In each period, the bubble (measured as the deviation 
of the asset price from its fundamental price) may continue to grow or 
may collapse with a positive probability. The collapse, when it occurs, is 
unexpected but not completely unforeseen since market participants are 
aware of the bubble and the probability distribution regarding its collapse. 
A considerable amount of modeling has examined the conditions in which 
a speculative bubble can be a rational equilibrium. 
4. Moral Hazard Crisis. Following Akerlof and Romer (1994), a moral 
hazard crisis arises because banks are able to borrow funds on the basis 
of implicit or explicit public guarantees of bank liabilities. If banks are 
undercapitalized or underregulated, they may use these funds in overly 
risky or even criminal ventures. Akerlof and Romer argue that the “eco- 
nomics of looting,” in which banks use their state backing to purloin de- 
posits, is more common than is generally perceived and played a large role 
in the U.S. savings and loan crisis. Krugman (1998) similarly argues that 
the Asian crisis is a reflection of excessive gambling and indeed stealing 
by banks that gained access to domestic and foreign deposits by virtue of 
state guarantees on these deposits. 
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5. Disorderly Workout. Following Sachs (1999, a disorderly workout oc- 
curs when an illiquid or insolvent borrower provokes a creditor grab race 
and a forced liquidation even though the borrower is worth more as an 
ongoing enterprise. A disorderly workout occurs especially when markets 
operate without the benefit of creditor coordination via bankruptcy law. 
The problem is sometimes known as a “debt overhang.” In essence, coordi- 
nation problems among creditors prevent the efficient provision of work- 
ing capital to the financially distressed borrower and delay or prevent the 
eventual discharge of bad debts ( e g ,  via debt-equity conversions or debt 
reduction). 
The theoretical differences among these five types of crises are significant 
at several levels: diagnosis, underlying mechanisms, prediction, preven- 
tion, and remediation. For example, to the extent that panic is important, 
policymakers face a condition in which viable economic activities are 
destroyed by a sudden and essentially unnecessary withdrawal of credits. 
The appropriate policy response, then, is to protect the economy through 
lender-of-last-resort activities. Alternatively, if the crisis results from the 
end of a bubble or the end of moral-hazard-based lending, it may be most 
efficient to avoid lender-of-last-resort operations, which simply keep the 
inefficient investments alive. Unfortunately, in real-life conditions, these 
various types of financial crisis can become intertwined and therefore are 
difficult to diagnose. The end of a bubble, for example, may trigger a panic, 
or a panic may trigger insolvency and a disorderly workout. Attentiveness 
to these kinds of possibilities is extremely important for policy design. 
Table 4.1 outlines four major considerations in the differential diagnosis 
and treatment of financial crises. Key distinguishing features are 
(1) whether the crisis is anticipated at least in probabilistic terms (e.g., in 
cases of policy inconsistency, bubble collapse, or disorderly workout) or 
whether the crisis is essentially unanticipated (financial panic); (2) whether 
the crisis destroys real economic value (e.g., a financial panic or disorderly 
workout) or instead brings to a close a period of resource misallocation 
(e.g., a collapse of a bubble); (3) whether the crisis mostly involves debtors 
backed by official resources (e.g., as in moral-hazard-induced banking cri- 
ses) or debtors that lack state guarantees (e.g., panics that undermine non- 
bank corporate borrowers); and (4) whether there is a case for official in- 
tervention (e.g., as lender of last resort). 
Financial panic is rarely the favored interpretation of a financial crisis. 
The essence of a panic is that a “bad” equilibrium occurs that did not 
have to happen. Market analysts and participants are much more prone 
to look for weightier explanations than simply a bad accident. Once in a 
while, though, a relatively clean test of the panic interpretation occurs. 
Perhaps the best recent case is the Mexican crisis in 1995. After the 
Table 4.1 Distinguishing among Financial Crises 
Policy-Induced 
Feature Crisis Financial Panic Bubble Collapse Moral Hazard Crisis Disorderly Workout 
Anticipation of 
crisis by market 
participants 
and analysts 
Destruction of 
real economic 
activity 
Lending induced 
by moral 
hazard 
Case for official 
intervention 
High 
Not necessarily 
No 
Macroeconomic 
adjustment, 
especially 
budgetary 
reduction 
Low Market 
participants 
and analysts 
understand 
probability of 
collapse 
High Low. The end of 
the bubble may 
improve 
resource 
allocation 
Not necessarily Possibly 
Lender of last No. Delaying the 
resort bursting of the 
bubble can lead 
to a deeper 
crisis later 
High. Creditors are lending 
based on state guarantees 
rather than fundamental 
values 
Low. The end of moral- 
hazard-based lending 
improves resource 
allocation 
Yes. Most or all creditors 
are protected by explicit 
or implicit guarantees 
prolong the misallocation 
of resources 
No. State guarantees 
High. Market participants 
understand the lack of 
coordination among 
creditors 
High. Creditor grab race; 
liquidity crisis of the 
borrower; premature 
liquidation of the 
borrower 
Not necessarily 
Yes. Public institutions may 
provide framework for an 
orderly workout 
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Mexican devaluation in December 1994, the Mexican government was un- 
able to roll over its short-term dollar-denominated debts (Tesobonos). The 
government was thrown to the brink of default. An emergency lender-of- 
last-resort operation led by the U.S. government and the IMF provided 
the Mexican government with up to $50 billion to repay the short-term 
debts. The Mexican government avoided default, repaid the emergency 
loans early, and resumed economic growth in 1996. Ex post, it is difficult 
to understand the market’s failure to roll over $28 billion in Tesobonos due 
in 1995 as anything other than panic in the face of a currency devaluation. 
In the following sections, we will point out several reasons to suppose 
that the Asian financial crisis also has substantial elements of panic and 
disorderly workout. First, the crisis was largely unanticipated. Although a 
small number of market participants were concerned ex ante, the vast ma- 
jority of players did not view the Southeast Asian economies as bubbles 
waiting to burst. Second, the crisis involved considerable lending to debt- 
ors who were not protected by state guarantees, and those loans are now 
going bad in large numbers. To be sure, many borrowers did have explicit 
or implicit guarantees (or thought they did), but a substantial number of 
purely private banks and firms without such insurance are now facing 
bankruptcy. Third, the crisis has led to a seizing up of bank credits to 
viable enterprises, especially through the lack of working capital for ex- 
porters. Fourth, the market has reacted most positively to initiatives that 
bring creditors and debtors together for orderly workouts, such as in Ko- 
rea. Fifth, the triggering events of the crisis involved the sudden with- 
drawal of investor funds to the region, rather than simply a deflation of 
asset values (although falling land and stock prices contributed to the 
crisis, especially in Thailand). 
4.3 Macroeconomic and Financial Processes in the Asian Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis has involved several interlinked phenomena. 
The single most dramatic element-perhaps the defining element-of the 
crisis has been the rapid reversal of private capital inflows into Asia. Table 
4.2, reproduced from a January 1998 report by the Institute of Interna- 
tional Finance (IIF), gives an estimated breakdown of the reversal of flows 
for the five East Asian countries hit hardest by the crisis (Indonesia, Ko- 
rea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, hereafter referred to as the 
Asian-5). According to these estimates, net private inflows dropped from 
$93 billion to -$12.1 billion, a swing of $105 billion on a combined pre- 
shock GDP of approximately $935 billion, or a swing of 11 percent of 
GDP. Of the $105 billion decline in inflows $77 billion came from commer- 
cial bank lending. Direct investment remained constant at around $7 bil- 
lion. The rest of the decline has come from a $24 billion fall in portfolio 
equity and a $5 billion decline in nonbank lending. 
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Table 4.2 Five Asian Economies: External Financing, 199498 (billion dollars) 
1994 1995 1996 1997a 199Sh 
Current account balance 
External financing, net 
Private flows, net 
Equity investment 
Direct equity 
Portfolio equity 
Private creditors 
Commercial banks 
Nonbank private creditors 
Official flows, net 
International financial institutions 
Bilateral creditors 
Resident lendinglothel; net' 
Reserves excluding goldd 
-24.6 -41.3 
47.4 80.9 
40.5 77.4 
12.2 15.5 
4.7 4.9 
7.6 10.6 
28.2 61.8 
24.0 49.5 
4.2 12.4 
7.0 3.6 
-0.4 -0.6 
7.4 4.2 
-17.5 -25.9 
-5.4 -13.7 
-54.9 
92.8 
93.0 
19.1 
7.0 
12.1 
74.0 
55.5 
18.4 
-0.2 
-1.0 
0.7 
- 19.6 
-18.3 
-26.0 
15.2 
-12.1 
-4.5 
7.2 
-11.6 
-7.6 
-21.3 
13.7 
27.2 
23.0 
4.3 
-11.9 
22.7 
17.6 
15.2 
-9.4 
7.9 
9.8 
-1.9 
-17.3 
-14.1 
-3.2 
24.6 
18.5 
6.1 
-5.7 
-27.1 
Source: Institute of International Finance (IIF 1998). 
Note: The five Asian economies are South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
"Estimate. 
hIIF forecast. 
cIncluding resident net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions. 
dNegative numbers denote increase. 
The sudden drop in bank lending followed a sustained period of large 
increases in cross-border bank loans, as shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4. Again 
taking the Asian-5 countries as our point of reference, total foreign bank 
lending to these countries expanded from $210 billion at the end of 1995 
to $261 billion at the end of 1996, an increase of 24 percent in a single year. 
Between the end of 1996 and mid-1997, bank lending expanded further to 
$274 billion, or an increase of 10 percent at an annual rate. The growth in 
bank loans clearly slowed during the first half of 1997 and actually de- 
clined slightly in the case of Thailand. Nonetheless, the continued increase 
in bank lending till mid-1997 is an important piece of evidence: outside of 
Thailand, foreign banks were not running until the last moment, though 
the pace of bank lending was abating somewhat. Since net outflows of 
bank loans reached $21 billion for 1997 as a whole according to the IIF, 
and since inflows during the first half of the year were $13 billion ac- 
cording to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), we can surmise 
that outflows during the second half of the year were approximately $34 
billion (note that BIS data for the second half of 1997 have not yet been 
released). With a combined preshock GDP of around $935 billion, net in- 
flows of bank loans amounted to around 5.9 percent of GDP in 1996,2.8 
percent of GDP in the first half of 1997, and -3.6 percent of GDP in the 
second half of 1997. Thus the swing in bank loans between 1996 and the 
second half of 1997 is a remarkable 9.5 percent of GDP. It is very difficult 
Table 4.3 International Claims Held by Foreign Banks: Distribution by Maturity and Sector, 199597 (billion dollars) 
~ 
Claims by Sector 
Total Nonbank Short Term/ 
Year and Country Outstanding Banks Public Sector Private Short Term Reserves Reserves 
End 1995 
Indonesia 44.5 8.9 6.7 28.8 27.6 14.7 1.9 
Malaysia 16.8 4.4 2.1 10.1 7.9 23.9 0.3 
Philippines 8.3 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.1 7.8 0.5 
Thailand 62.8 25.8 2.3 34.7 43.6 37.0 1.2 
Korea 77.5 50.0 6.2 21.4 54.3 32.7 1.7 
Total 209.9 91.3 20.0 98.4 137.5 
End 1996 
Indonesia 55.5 11.7 6.9 36.8 34.2 19.3 1.8 
Malaysia 22.2 6.5 2.0 13.7 11.2 27.1 0.4 
Philippines 13.3 5.2 2.7 5.3 7.7 11.7 0.7 
Thailand 70.2 25.9 2.3 41.9 45.7 38.7 1.2 
Korea 100.0 65.9 5.7 28.3 67.5 34.1 2.0 
Total 261.2 115.2 19.6 126.0 166.3 
Mid-1997 
Indonesia 58.7 12.4 6.5 39.7 34.7 20.3 1.7 
Malaysia 28.8 10.5 1.9 16.5 16.3 26.6 0.6 
Thailand 69.4 26.1 2.0 41.3 45.6 31.4 1.5 
Korea 103.4 67.3 4.4 31.7 70.2 34.1 2.1 
Philippines 14.1 5.5 1.9 6.8 8.3 9.8 0.8 
Total 274.4 121.8 16.7 136.0 175.1 
Memo item 
Mexico 
End 1994 64.6 16.7 24.9 22.8 33.2 6.4 5.2 
End 1995 57.3 11.5 23.5 22.3 26.0 17.1 I .5 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1998). 
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Table 4.4 International Claims Held by Foreign Banks: Distribution by Country of Origin, 
199597 (billion dollars) 
Claims by Country 
Year and Country 
Total United All 
Outstanding Japan States Germany Others 
End I995 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Korea 
Subtotal 
Total, all reporting countries" 
End 1996 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Korea 
Subtotal 
Total, all reporting countries" 
Mid-I997 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Korea 
Subtotal 
Total, all reporting countries" 
44.5 
16.8 
8.3 
62.8 
77.5 
209.9 
55.5 
22.2 
13.3 
70.2 
100.0 
261.2 
58.7 
28.8 
14.1 
69.4 
103.4 
274.4 
21.0 
7.3 
1 .0 
36.9 
21.5 
87.1 
429.3 
22.0 
8.2 
1.6 
31.5 
24.3 
93.6 
389.4 
23.2 
10.5 
2.1 
37.7 
23.7 
97.2 
404.4 
2.8 3.9 16.8 
1.5 2.2 5.8 
2.9 0.7 3.7 
4.1 5.0 16.8 
7.6 7.3 41.1 
18.9 19.1 84.2 
132.6 264.0 
5.3 5.5 22.7 
2.3 3.9 7.8 
3.9 1.8 6.0 
5.0 6.9 20.8 
9.4 10.0 56.3 
25.9 28.1 113.6 
165.7 292.3 
4.6 5.6 25.3 
2.4 5.7 10.2 
2.8 2.0 7.2 
4.0 7.6 20.1 
10.0 10.8 58.9 
23.8 31.7 121.7 
166.3 301.2 
Source; Bank for International Settlements (1998). 
"Reporting countries include the G-10 plus Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, 
and Spain, plus fifteen financial centers. 
to attribute a reversal of this magnitude in such a short period of time to 
changes in underlying economic fundamentals. 
Bank lending went to both domestic banks and domestic nonbank bor- 
rowers during this period, as shown in table 4.3. In Korea, lending was 
heavily to banks; in Indonesia, lending was heavily to nonbank corporate 
borrowers. In all countries except Korea, bank lending to nonbanks ex- 
ceeded lending to banks. We might suppose that international banks 
assumed that lending to bunks was at least partly protected by lender-of- 
last-resort facilities, both domestic (e.g., from the central bank) and inter- 
national (e.g., from the IMF). The same might be true for a portion of 
private sector firms with particularly strong political connections. There 
is no reason to suppose, however, that foreign banks expected such guar- 
antees on lending to the majority of nonbank private corporations. Nota- 
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bly, lending to nonbanks as well as to banks continued to increase strongly 
until mid- 1997. 
The withdrawal of foreign capital has had several interlocking macro- 
economic and microeconomic effects. Most immediately and dramatically, 
exchange rates depreciated, after a defense of a pegged exchange rate (as 
in Thailand and the phi lip pine^)^ or a crawling peg (as in Indonesia, Ma- 
laysia, and Korea). Domestic interest rates soared on the withdrawal of 
foreign credits, leading directly to a tightening of domestic credit condi- 
tions even before central banks reacted to the c r i~ i s .~  Since the withdrawal 
of credits immediately led to a sharp reduction of absorption (which had 
been financed by foreign capital inflows), not only the nominal exchange 
rate but also the real exchange rate (defined as the ratio of tradable to 
nontradable goods prices) depreciated. 
The combination of real exchange rate depreciation and sharply higher 
interest rates led to a rapid rise in nonperforming loans in the banking 
sectors of the Asian economies, especially as real estate projects went into 
bankruptcy. In many cases, real estate developers had borrowed in un- 
hedged dollar-denominated loans from domestic banks to finance real es- 
tate projects. These projects failed under the weight of currency depreci- 
ation. Moreover, to the extent that banks had open short positions in 
dollars (i.e., were net dollar borrowers), the exchange rate depreciation 
led to a sudden loss of bank capital. The combination of sharply rising 
nonperforming loans and direct balance sheet losses due to currency de- 
preciation has wiped out a substantial portion of the market value of bank 
capital in Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea. 
The sudden withdrawal of foreign financing was itself an enormous con- 
tractionary shock. The resulting collapse of domestic bank capital added 
sharply to the contraction by severely restricting bank lending. Banks cut 
back their own lending both because the banks themselves were illiquid 
(as a result of the withdrawal of foreign credits and, in some cases, de- 
posits) and because they were decapitalized. The decapitalized banks 
restricted their lending in order to move toward capital adequacy ratios 
required by bank supervisors and reinforced by the IMF. The rush to im- 
prove bank capital adequacy took on urgent proportions in Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand, after the IMF threatened to require the closure of 
undercapitalized banks. This threat was credible in view of the moves to 
suspend or close financial companies and banks throughout the region at 
the start of each of the IMF adjustment programs. 
As described below, the IMF programs up until the end of 1997 appar- 
ently added both to the panic and to the contractionary force of the fi- 
3. Technically, the Philippine peso operated under a floating regime, but there was so little 
variation in the exchange rate that it was perceived to be effectively pegged to the dollar by 
market participants. 
4. As we note later, central banks augmented the rise in interest rates by a further tight- 
ening of domestic credit in the context of IMF-supported adjustment programs. 
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nancial crisis. The IMF programs generally called for six key actions: im- 
mediate bank closures, quick restoration of minimum capital adequacy 
standards (especially in the first Thai and Indonesian programs), tight 
domestic credit, high interest rates on central bank discount facilities, fis- 
cal contraction, and nonfinancial sector structural changes. Of all of these 
measures, the bank closures, capital adequacy enforcement, and tight 
credit were probably the most consequential in that they probably added 
to the virulence of the banking panics that were already under way in these 
economies. Domestic bank lending stopped abruptly in the three countries 
with IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand). There were wide- 
spread anecdotes about firms unable to obtain working capital, even in 
support of confirmed export orders from abroad. 
On 22 December 1997, Moody’s downgraded the sovereign debt of all 
three of these countries, putting them below investment grade. The “junk 
bond” status of these countries immediately applied to the banking and 
nonbank corporate sectors as well, by virtue of the “sovereign ceiling” 
doctrine, according to which all domestic enterprises must have a credit 
rating no higher than the sovereign. The downgrade had two major imme- 
diate implications. First, most of the commercial banks in these countries 
could no longer issue internationally recognized letters of credit for do- 
mestic exporters and importers, since the banks were all rated as below 
investment grade. Second, the downgrading immediately prompted a fur- 
ther round of debt liquidations, since many portfolio managers are re- 
quired by law to maintain investments only in investment grade securities. 
Moreover, the downgrade triggered various put options linked to credit 
ratings, enabling borrowers to call in loans immediately on the downgrade. 
As a result of the creditor panic, the bank runs, and the sovereign down- 
grades, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand were thrown into partial debt de- 
faults. In the case of Korea, these defaults were initially handled by an 
emergency standstill of debt repayments, followed by a concerted rollover 
of the short-term debt into longer term instruments backed by Korean 
government guarantees. This rollover applies to around one-third of the 
Korean external debt falling due in 1998. In the case of Indonesia, the 
defaults were unilateral and have not been followed to this point by any 
negotiated arrangements. In Thailand, the extent of outright default re- 
mains unclear, though certain payments by nonbank borrowers are clearly 
in effective default. 
4.4 Why the Asian Crisis Was Not Predicted 
4.4.1 Capital Flows into Southeast Asia 
We have stressed that at the core of the Asian financial crisis were the 
massive capital inflows attracted into the region during the 1990s. Capital 
inflows increased from an average of 1.4 percent of GDP over 1986-90 to 
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6.7 percent over 1990-96. In Thailand, capital inflows averaged a remark- 
ably high 10.3 percent of GDP over 1990-96. The bulk of Thailand’s in- 
flows came in the form of offshore borrowing by banks and private cor- 
porations, which together averaged 7.6 percent of GDP in the 1990s. 
Portfolio capital inflows (1.6 percent of GDP) and foreign direct invest- 
ment (FDI-1.1 percent of GDP) were substantially smaller. Although 
Thailand was the most extreme case, across the region the bulk of the 
capital inflows were from offshore borrowing by banks and the private 
sector. Malaysia is the only exception, where extraordinarily large FDI in- 
flows (6.6 percent of GDP) were larger than bank and private sector bor- 
rowing (3.6 percent of GDP). In each country, net portfolio capital inflows 
averaged less than 2 percent of GDP. In Malaysia, where short-term for- 
eign investors have been harshly criticized, net portfolio inflows were ei- 
ther very small or actually negative in each year of the 1990s. Importantly, 
net government borrowing was less than half a percent of GDP in each 
country, except in the Philippines, where it averaged 1.3 percent of GDP. 
Banks (in Thailand and Korea) and private corporations (in Indonesia) 
were the main forces behind the capital inflows, not the government. 
The surge in capital inflows had its roots in changes in both internal 
economic policies and world markets. Internationally, capital market lib- 
eralization in the industrialized countries facilitated a greater flow of funds 
to emerging markets around the globe, including the Philippines. New 
bond and equity mutual funds, new bank syndicates, increased Eurobond 
lending, and other innovations allowed capital to flow across borders 
quickly and easily, In addition, low interest rates in the United States and 
Japan favored increased outward investment from these countries to 
Southeast Asia and other emerging markets. Domestically, five broad fac- 
tors contributed to the capital flows: 
Continuing, and in some cases increasing, high economic growth gave 
confidence to foreign investors. 
Wide-ranging financial deregulation made it much easier for banks and 
domestic corporations to tap into foreign capital to finance domestic in- 
vestments. 
Financial sector deregulation was not accompanied by adequate supervi- 
sion, especially in Thailand. Lax supervision created an environment 
conducive to high rates of foreign borrowing, since it allowed banks to 
take on substantial foreign currency and maturity risks. 
Nominal exchange rates were effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar, with 
either limited variation (Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and the Philip- 
pines) or very predictable change (Indonesia). Predictable exchange rates 
reduced perceived risks for investors, further encouraging capital in- 
flows. 
Governments gave special incentives that encouraged foreign borrowing, 
even after concern arose about “hot money” flows in the early 1990s. 
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Banks operating in the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), 
which operated exclusively in borrowing and lending foreign curren- 
cies, received special tax breaks. In the Philippines, banks are subject 
to a tax rate of 10 percent for onshore income from foreign exchange 
loans, whereas other income is subject to the regular corporate income 
tax rate of 35 percent. Philippine banks also face no reserve require- 
ments for foreign currency deposits, while for peso deposits the reserve 
requirement currently is 13 percent, down from 15 percent in 1996 
(IMF 1997b). 
Capital flows from abroad can be an important engine for growth if 
they are channeled to productive investment activities. However, foreign 
capital flows can make macroeconomic management much more complex 
when they are large, volatile, unsustainable, or poorly utilized. Macroeco- 
nomic pressures tend to manifest themselves through two channels: 
Capital inflows lead to a real appreciation of the exchange rate, and to an 
expansion of nontradable sectors at the expense of tradable sectors. 
Even though this real appreciation tends to be temporary (since it is 
reversed when the net foreign borrowing is serviced in future years), new 
investments tend to be drawn toward nontradables, partly as a result of 
myopic expectations regarding real exchange rate trends. 
High levels of capital inflow place new pressures on underdeveloped fi- 
nancial systems. In both commercial banks (which are intermediating 
rapidly growing levels of foreign financing) and central banks (which are 
trying to regulate and supervise rapidly growing activities), institutional 
change generally cannot keep pace with the high levels of international 
capital flow. There are ample conditions for excessive risk taking, poor 
banking judgment, and even outright fraud. 
Both of these kinds of pressures, over time, contribute to increasing 
financial risk. Following a liberalization and a rapid inflow of capital, 
some slowdown of foreign borrowing is to be expected. The most profit- 
able investment opportunities are seized early; overinvestment in nontrad- 
ables (e.g., real estate) becomes evident; and a slowdown in export growth 
gives pause to both foreign and domestic investors. There is no reason, 
however, to expect a sudden and sharp reversal of capital flows. The pre- 
ceding inflow of foreign funds into Asia was a precondition for the subse- 
quent crisis, but the capital inflows do not, by themselves, explain the crisis 
that followed. 
4.4.2 
One of the most unusual aspects of the Asian crisis is the extent to 
which it was unpredicted by market participants and market analysts. Al- 
though some observers did anticipate the possibility of a crisis (see, e.g., 
Park 1996), such warnings were rare. This actually tells us a lot. Just as 
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the silence of the hound alerted Sherlock Holmes to the real culprit in 
“The Silver Blaze,” the fact that the financial markets did not signal alarm 
helps us to understand the real nature of the crisis. All signs point to a very 
recent and dramatic shift in expectations. For example, capital inflows 
remained strong through 1996, and in most cases until mid-1997. The only 
exception to this is found in the equity markets in Thailand and Korea, 
where foreign investors became uneasy in 1996. In Malaysia, both bank 
and equity investors showed optimism until 1997. Equity markets began 
a rather steep decline in March 1997, while bank inflows continued to be 
very strong at least until midyear. In Indonesia, both the stock market and 
bank lending remained strong until mid-1997. 
Another indicator of market sentiment is the risk premiums attached to 
loans to emerging market economies. To the extent that markets antici- 
pated the growing risks of capital inflow, lending terms and conditions 
would have tightened in advance of the onset of the crisis. In fact, the 
evidence suggests just the opposite. A study by William Cline and Kevin 
Barnes (1997) at the Institute of International Finance found that bond 
spreads (i.e., the interest rate premium over U.S. Treasury securities) fell 
in emerging markets, including Southeast Asia, between mid- 1995 (as the 
Mexico crisis came to a close) and mid-1997 to levels well below what 
could be justified by economic fundamentals in these countries. Similarly, 
syndicated loan spreads were also low and falling before the crisis. In In- 
donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea, syndicated loan spreads 
were lower in early 1997 than they had been in 1996. Only in Thailand did 
spreads begin to rise somewhat in early 1997, but from a very low base. 
The spread on Thai sovereign bonds stood at an extremely low 39 basis 
points in the second quarter of 1996 and was just 43 basis points at the 
end of 1996. The spread began to rise in early 1997 but was still just 79 
basis points in August, a month after the crisis had begun. 
Credit-rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s provide 
an ongoing assessment of credit risk in emerging markets. We may there- 
fore examine, directly, whether increasing risk in these markets was recog- 
nized. If the markets expected a financial crisis and public sector bailouts, 
the ratings of sovereign bonds should have fallen in the run-up to the 
crisis. Instead, on examining data such as those in table 4.5, we find that 
the rating agencies did not signal increased risk until after the onset of 
the crisis itself. Long-term sovereign debt ratings remained unchanged 
throughout 1996 and the first half of 1997 for each of the Asian countries 
except the Philippines, where debt was actually upgraded in early 1997. In 
each country, the outlook was described as “positive” or “stable” through 
June 1997. Only many weeks after the crisis had begun did these rating 
agencies downgrade the region’s debt. At that point, rather than helping 
creditors assess future risk, the downgrades simply pushed interest rates 
higher and added to the panic. 
Aside from credit-rating agencies, a number of independent firms 
Table 4.5 Market Creditworthiness: Moody's and Standard and Poor's Long-Term Debt Ratings, 1%W 
Agency and Country 
15 January 1996 2 December 1996 24June 1997 12 December 1997" 
Rating Outlook Rating Outlook Rating Outlook Rating Outlook 
Moody> foreign currency debt 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Siundurd & Poori 
Indonesia 
Foreign currency debt 
Domestic currency debt 
Foreign currency debt 
Domestic currency debt 
Foreign currency debt 
Domestic currency debt 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea: foreign currency debt 
Thailand 
Foreign currency debt 
Domestic currency debt 
Foreign currency debt 
Domestic currency debt 
Mexico 
Baa3 
A1 
Ba2 
Ba2 
A1 
A2 
BBB Stable 
A+ Stable 
A A i  
BB Positive 
BBB+ 
AA- Stable 
A Stable 
BB 
BBB+ Negative 
Baa3 
A1 
Ba2 
Ba2 
A1 Stable 
A2 
BBB Stable 
A+ 
A+ Stable 
AA+ 
BB Positive 
BBB + 
AA- Stable 
A Stable 
AA 
BB 
BBB+ Stable 
Baa3 
A1 
Ba2 
Ba 1 
A2 
BBB 
A+ 
A+ 
AA+ 
B B i  
A- 
A 
AA 
BB 
BBB+ 
Baa3 
A1 
Ba2 
Ba 1 
Baa2 
Baal 
Stable BBB- 
A- 
Positive A+ 
AA+ 
Positive BB + 
A- 
Stable BBB 
A 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Stable 
Stable 
Negative 
Negative 
Note: Rating systems, from highest to lowest: Moody's: Aaa, Aal, Aa2, Aa3, Al ,  A2, A3, Baal, Baa2, Baa3, Bal, Ba2, Ba3. S&P's: AAA, AA+, AA, 
"October 1997 for S&P's ratings. 
AA-, A+ ,  A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-. 
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Table 4.6 Euromoney Country Risk Ratings, 1993-97 (country rank out of 
approximately 180) 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Singapore 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
March 
1993 
March 
1995 
41 
33 
71 
34 
32 
14 
1 
25 
40 
28 
60 
30 
26 
8 
2 
24 
March 
1991 
43 
28 
54 
34 
22 
3 
13 
27 
September December 
1997 1991 
43 49 
28 35 
49 51 
46 51 
21 30 
11 16 
13 18 
25 25 
provide ongoing risk analysis. One widely circulated assessment is the Eu- 
romoney Country Risk Assessment, shown in table 4.6. We can trace the 
changes in risk attached to the key Asian economies according to the Eu- 
romoney rankings. In most cases, Asia’s country rankings changed little 
or even improved (in the cases of the Philippines and South Korea) be- 
tween March 1993 and March 1997, providing little warning of the grow- 
ing risks to investors. Even in September 1997, after the crisis had begun, 
the Philippines’ ranking continued to improve, and Indonesia’s and Ma- 
laysia’s remained steady. Only Thailand’s and South Korea’s rankings fell 
sharply. Rankings for the other countries did not tumble until December, 
five months after the onset of the crisis. Note that the country rankings 
for Singapore (from 3 in March 1997 to 16 in December 1997) and Japan 
(from 1 in March 1993 to 18 in December 1997) have both fallen sharply. 
The leading investment banks also provide ongoing forecasts of overall 
economic performance and market returns. Therefore, we can look at the 
major forecasts to see whether there were growing indications of risk in the 
lead-up to the crisis. Table 4.7 shows export and exchange rate forecasts as 
produced by Goldman Sachs, perhaps the most capable of all the invest- 
ment banks in the region. These forecasts show the extent to which the 
dramatic slowdown in export growth in 1996 and 1997 was unanticipated. 
Even after the poor 1996 performance, analysts expected a rebound in 
1997 (except in Thailand), which was not forthcoming (except in the Phil- 
ippines). With regard to exchange rates, no one in the markets anticipated 
the extent to which currencies would depreciate, even once the crisis be- 
gan. The August 1997 exchange rate forecasts-produced one month after 
the crisis had begun in Thailand-show little expectation of the slide that 
took place in the following months. 
Another measure of expectations for the region may be found in IMF 
reports on the Asian economies. The IMF makes two kinds of public as- 
sessments: overall market forecasts, as presented in its periodic World Ec- 
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Table 4.7 Export Growth and Exchange Rate Expectations 
Exchange Rate 
Export Growth^ August 1997 
Expected Outcome Expected Revised Three-Month 29 October 
Country 1996 1996 1997 1997 Horizon 1997 Rateh 
Forecast: 
Indonesia 14.3 4.9 15.0 10.0 2,500 3,610 
(44.4) 
Malaysia 18.0 7.3 15.0 7.4 2.75 3.40 
(23.6) 
Philippines 25.0 17.7 23.0 22.8 28.00 35.1 
(25.3) 
Thailand 22.0 -1.7 7.7 -0.5 32.00 39.1 
(22.2) 
Sources: August 1997 forecast, Goldman Sachs, Asian Economic Quurlerly, August 1997, p. 12.29 Octo- 
ber 1997 rate, Economist, 1 November 1997. 
=Expected 1996 from December 1995 forecast, expected 1997 from December 1996 forecast, and revised 
1997 from August 1997 forecast. 
hNumbers in parentheses are expectation errors as percentage of August 1997 forecast. 
onomic Outlook, and country assessments, generally contained in the re- 
ports of Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with 
member countries. With regard to the market forecasts, the IMF gave very 
little indication of a sense of macroeconomic risk to the Asian region. As 
late as the October 1997 World Economic Outlook (IMF 1997c), the TMF 
predicted 6.0 percent growth for Korea in 1998 and 7.4 percent for devel- 
oping Asia (or 5.4 percent for developing Asia excluding China and In- 
dia). These marked a predicted slowdown of about 1.5 percentage points 
relative to 1995. 
With regard to the Article IV consultations, the 1997 IMF Annuul Re- 
port (IMF 1997a) contains summaries of IMF Executive Board discus- 
sions on Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand that took place during the sec- 
ond half of 1996. Since the Annual Report is not completed until much 
later (transmitted in July 1997), the IMF staff may update the summary 
with an additional paragraph in the event of dramatic changes in policies 
or economic circumstances. Thus we may interpret the summaries as con- 
veying the basic attitude of the IMF up to the date of the Annual Report, 
that is, until mid-1997. In general, the IMF Executive Board expressed 
concerns about the Asian economies, but in the context of overall opti- 
mism. There are several common features in the analysis of the three coun- 
tries. The IMF recommends (1) more flexible exchange rates, (2) improved 
banking sector supervision, (3) tightened fiscal policy, and (4) increased 
openness to capital flows. The most explicit concerns were raised in the 
case of Indonesia; the least, in the case of Korea. But in no case did the 
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board express major concerns. Some excerpts from the board discussions 
are included in the appendix. 
Stock prices provide the only indication of growing concern among 
market participants in the months preceding the crisis. The Thai stock 
market fell continuously after January 1996, a full eighteen months before 
the crisis began. The main index fell 40 percent in 1996 alone and dropped 
an additional 20 percent in the first six months of 1997 as concern grew 
over the health of property companies and financial institutions. The 
Seoul bourse also fell sharply during 1996 and early 1997. In the case of 
Thailand, the stock market decline was matched by a slight decline in 
foreign bank lending in the first half of 1997. In the case of Korea, foreign 
bank lending continued to rise in the first half of 1997, albeit at a slower 
rate than in 1996. In Indonesia, by contrast, both the stock market and 
bank lending show continued confidence until mid- 1997. In Malaysia, the 
stock market began to turn down in March, while foreign bank lending 
rose very strongly in the first half of 1997 (increasing by a remarkable 29.7 
percent in the six-month period). 
4.4.3 Why Did No Alarm Bells Ring? 
One reason the crisis was largely unanticipated by international lenders 
and most market observers was that many of the signals analysts normally 
associate with impending problems showed little sign of deterioration. 
Most fundamental aspects of macroeconomic management remained 
sound throughout the early 1990s. Government budgets, which were at the 
center of economic crises in Latin America in the 198Os, registered regular 
surpluses in each country. This will be an important fact to remember 
when we turn to appropriate solutions for addressing the crisis. While gov- 
ernments may have been too enthusiastic in promoting large-scale infra- 
structure investment financed by foreign inflows, and while there are no 
doubt important fiscal liabilities outside of the formal budget, all five 
countries maintained fairly responsible budgetary positions between 1990 
and 1996, as shown in table 4.8. Thailand’s budget reportedly deteriorated 
markedly in late 1996 and early 1997, partly in response to the crisis itself, 
Table 4.8 
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Korea Mexico 
Overall Central Government Budget Balance, 1990-96 (percent of GDP) 
1990 0.4 -3.0 -3.5 4.5 -0.7 -2.8 
1991 0.4 -2.0 -2.1 4.7 -1.6 -0.2 
1992 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 2.8 -0.5 1.5 
1993 0.6 0.2 -1.5 2.1 0.6 0.3 
1994 0.9 2.3 ’ 1.1 1.9 0.3 -0.7 
1995 2.2 0.9 0.5 2.9 0.3 -0.6 
1996 1.2 0.7 0.3 2.3 -0.1 n.a. 
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rather than as an independent cause. Partly as a result of budgetary pru- 
dence, inflation rates have been below 10 percent across the region during 
the 1990s. Sovereign debt remained at prudent levels and had been steadily 
falling in the Philippines and Indonesia, the two countries in the region 
with historically high levels of sovereign foreign debt. 
Similarly, domestic saving and investment rates were very high through- 
out the region, suggesting that even if foreign capital flows slowed, robust 
growth could continue. Moreover, while current account deficits were 
large, capital inflows were even larger, so foreign exchange reserves were 
actually growing across the region (except in Malaysia, where they leveled 
off after 1993). Foreign exchange reserves at the end of 1996 were well 
over four months of imports in each country except South Korea, where 
they were equivalent to 2.8 months of imports. In Thailand, official figures 
suggest that reserves reached a seemingly very healthy $38.6 billion at the 
end of 1996, equivalent to  over 7 months of imports (although it was ap- 
parently around this time that Thailand began to take forward positions 
in the foreign exchange market, so the official figures may overstate the 
actual level of net reserves). 
At the same time, world market conditions did not portend a crisis, as 
they had in Latin America when world interest rates rose, commodity 
prices were highly volatile, and industrial country growth rates were slow. 
Indeed, world interest rates have been unusually low in recent years, so 
that the burden of repaying foreign obligations did not seem onerous. Al- 
though some important prices (e.g., semiconductors) slumped, key com- 
modity prices have been relatively stable, so external terms of trade 
changed little. Of course, the Japanese economy has been very sluggish 
throughout the 1990s, but the U.S. economy, which is the major market for 
most of Asia’s exports, has been very robust. In sum, the macroeconomic 
fundamentals across Asia seemed sound, and the usual alarm bells were 
not ringing. As a result, the crisis was not easily predictable. 
4.4.4 
There were, however, several signs of growing financial vulnerability dur- 
ing 1996 and early 1997. In some cases (e.g., growing current account defi- 
cits, overvalued exchange rates, and slowing export growth), these signs 
seemed merely to suggest growing imbalances and the need for a modest 
adjustment, but not an impending major crisis. In other cases, important 
indicators appear to have been missed by the market (e.g., rapid expansion 
of commercial bank credit and growing short-term foreign debt). 
In line with the high levels of capital inflow, current account deficits 
were growing increasingly large across the region in the early 1990s and 
were far higher than they had been in the late 1980s. Between 1985 and 
1989, current account deficits averaged just 0.3 percent of GDP in the 
five countries (table 4.9). In fact, South Korea and Malaysia had current 
account surpluses of 4.3 and 2.4 percent of GDP, respectively. The largest 
Some Signs of Growing Risk 
Table 4.9 Balance of Payments, 1985% (percent of GDP) 
Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
1985-89 1990-96 1985-89 1990-95 1985-89 1990-95 1985-89 1990-96 1985-89 1990-95 
Current account 
Balance of trade 
Exports 
Imports 
account 
Capital and financial 
Direct investment, net 
Portfolio investment, net 
Equity securities 
Debt securities 
Other investment, net 
Monetary authorities 
General government 
Banks 
Other sectors 
Financing 
Reserve assets 
4.3 
3.6 
30.7 
-27.2 
-2.5 
-0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
0.1 
-2.4 
-0.0 
-1.2 
-0.8 
-0.4 
-1.7 
-1.4 
-1.7 -2.5 
-1.2 5.9 
25.0 21.9 
-26.2 -15.9 
2.5 3.5 
-0.3 0.5 
1.9 -0.0 
0.8 0.0 
1.1 -0.0 
1 .o 3.0 
-0.0 0.0 
-0.3 2.6 
0.1 0.0 
1.2 0.4 
-0.6 -0.1 
-0.6 -0.2 
-2.5 2.4 
4.5 13.7 
24.2 56.1 
- 19.7 -42.5 
4.1 0.5 
1.2 2.4 
0.9 1 .o 
0.5 0.0 
0.4 1 .o 
2.0 -2.8 
0.0 0.0 
0.5 -1.7 
0.4 -1.0 
1.2 -0.0 
-1.1 -2.9 
-1.0 -2.7 
-5.6 
3.2 
73.2 
-70.0 
9.6 
6.9 
- 1.0 
0.0 
-1.0 
3.8 
0.0 
-0.3 
I .8 
2.4 
-5.0 
-5.0 
-0.5 
-2.9 
17.1 
-20.0 
1.4 
1 .o 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.2 
-0.6 
2.3 
-0.2 
-1.2 
-1.8 
-1.0 
-3.3 -2.0 
-8.7 -2.2 
17.4 22.9 
-26.1 -25.1 
5.5 4.2 
1.1 1.1 
0.3 1.2 
0.0 0.8 
0.3 0.4 
4.0 2.0 
0.0 0.0 
1.1 0.2 
1.4 0.2 
1.6 1.5 
-1.8 -3.0 
-1.7 -2.7 
-6.8 
-4.7 
29.6 
-34.3 
10.2 
1.5 
1.5 
0.7 
0.9 
7.1 
0.0 
-0.4 
3.5 
4.0 
-3.6 
-3.5 
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deficit was Indonesia’s 2.5 percent of GDP, which resulted primarily from 
the fall in world petroleum prices in the mid-1980s. By contrast, between 
1990 and 1996, current account deficits averaged 4.0 percent of GDP and 
in most countries were rising. Only Indonesia’s deficit remained basic- 
ally unchanged relative to the earlier period, although it rose slightly to 
3.5 percent of GDP in 1995 and 1996. Korea’s current account position 
shifted by 6 percentage points of GDP, which is a very large change, but 
the deficit still averaged less than 2 percent of GDP, which appeared pru- 
dent. However, in 1996 the deficit abruptly grew to 4.8 percent of GDP. 
Malaysia’s deficit increased by 8 percentage points of GDP, Thailand’s 
by nearly 5 percentage points, and the Philippines’ by about 3 percentage 
points (though in this case, the actual increase was probably larger, since 
certain Philippines’ inflows are probably misclassified as current account 
receipts). But the current account deficit is not always a good predictor: 
Indonesia and South Korea, with the smallest deficits, have arguably been 
the hardest hit countries, while Malaysia’s deficit was much larger in 1995 
(8.6 percent of GDP) than it was in 1996 (5.3 percent) or early 1997. 
In line with the current account deficits and large capital inflows, ex- 
change rates appreciated significantly in real terms between 1990 and the 
first quarter of 1997. It is difficult to precisely measure real exchange rates 
in these countries, since there are no accurate, direct data on the prices of 
tradable and nontradable goods, or on labor productivity or labor costs. 
In table 4.10, we show a common approximation in which the real ex- 
change rate is calculated as the ratio (EP)*IP, where P is the home country 
consumer price index (CPI) and (El‘)* is the foreign country wholesale 
price index (WPI) expressed in the local currency by converting the foreign 
WPI to the domestic currency using the contemporaneous nominal ex- 
change rate.5 (El‘)* is calculated using a geometric average of prices for 
the major developed country trading partners.6 (We calculated alternative 
measures of the real exchange rate using foreign consumer and import 
price indexes in the numerator, as well as a simple ratio of domestic whole- 
sale to consumer price indexes, with similar results.) 
In table 4.10, we observe a significant real appreciation between 1990 
and 1997: Q1 in all five countries. The real appreciation exceeds 25 percent 
in each of the four Southeast Asian nations and was especially rapid after 
1994, when the US. dollar began to appreciate against other major world 
currencies. Indeed, in many ways the appreciation of the dollar against 
the yen marked a turning point for Southeast Asia and the beginning of 
the stage of overvaluation. The appreciation in Korea was a more modest 
12 percent (but amounted to over 30 percent between 1987 and 1997). In 
5. The idea of using the CPI in the denominator and the WPI in the numerator is that 
the CPI is heavily weighted toward nontradable goods, while the WPI is heavily weighted 
toward tradables. 
6. Specifically, we use all trading partners that are members of the OECD, except Mexico 
and Korea. 
Table 4.10 Real Exchange Rate Index, 198tL97 (1990 = 100) 
Month and Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Korea Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico 
December 1988 
December 1989 
December 1990 
December 1991 
December 1992 
December 1993 
December 1994 
December 1995 
December 1996 
March 1997 
June 1997 
September 1997 
December 1997 
98 
93 
100 
99 
92 
88 
92 
89 
80 
75 
78 
99 
150 
98 
94 
100 
99 
87 
88 
86 
84 
78 
72 
75 
92 
108 
90 
85 
100 
82 
69 
71 
62 
63 
56 
53 
54 
66 
75 
102 
98 
100 
97 
90 
88 
89 
87 
80 
75 
76 
104 
124 
80 
85 
100 
103 
98 
86 
109 
95 
84 
79 
80 
77 
74 
102 
95 
100 
99 
94 
93 
91 
88 
88 
89 
89 
88 
I57 
156 
692 
100 
66 
49 
42 
44 
46 
44 
42 
42 
42 
41 
159 
175 
100 
112 
119 
148 
53 
39 
35 
33 
33 
33 
33 
94 
99 
I00 
91 
74 
71 
66 
65 
61 
55 
55 
53 
53 
106 
107 
100 
85 
74 
67 
111 
123 
95 
81 
79 
75 
75 
N o w  Table reports end-of-period exchange rates based on WPI. Estimates are based on trade weights of OECD countries excluding Mexico and Korea. An 
increase means depreciation. 
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fact, the actual real appreciations may have been even larger than these 
indexes indicate, since our proxy for nontradable prices (the domestic 
CPI) does not include property, real estate, and other nontradable sectors 
that were booming in the early 1990s. 
Despite their simplicity, these indexes are informative. Such large ap- 
preciations in a relatively short period of time have often been associated 
with a subsequent balance-of-payments crisis. Nevertheless, we should be 
careful not to overstate the magnitude of the appreciations. While they 
signaled the need for some kind of correction, the appreciations were not 
nearly as large as those in Latin America. Mexico’s exchange rate appreci- 
ated in real terms by 40 percent between 1988 and 1993, just before its 
most recent crisis. Several other countries around the world experienced 
even larger real appreciations without the kind of crisis seen in either Mex- 
ico or Southeast Asia. 
As expected with the real appreciation, export growth rates fell sharply 
in 1996 and 1997. Export growth, as measured in nominal dollar terms, 
fell from an average of 24.8 percent in the five countries in 1995 to just 7.2 
percent in 1996 and fell further in early 1997. In Thailand, exports were 
actually lower (by 2 percent) in nominal dollar terms in 1996 than they 
had been in 1995. (In fact, the slowdown in Thailand’s exports was ulti- 
mately a critical factor in the reversal of expectations in mid-1997 that 
launched the crisis.) Broadly speaking, the export slowdown should have 
provided some indication that investment quality was weakening and that 
firms would be less able to repay foreign exchange obligations. Neverthe- 
less, the slowdown was thought to be very short term and accounted for 
by specific commodities (e.g., semiconductors) rather than a sign of an 
impending crisis. 
Probably the biggest signs of growing risk were in the financial sector. 
Financial institutions were becoming increasingly fragile throughout the 
1990s. Banks strained to keep up with both rapidly growing incomes (and 
the concurrent demand for more sophisticated financial services) and the 
huge amounts of capital flowing in from abroad. Credit to the private 
sector expanded very rapidly, with much of it financed by offshore bor- 
rowing by the banking sector. Financial sector claims on the private sector 
jumped from around 100 percent of GDP in 1990 to over 140 percent in 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea (table 4.1 1). In the Philippines, the stock 
of credit was much smaller (reaching just 49 percent of GDP in 1996), but 
credit grew by an average of over 40 percent per year from 1993 to 1996. 
Only in Indonesia did credit growth remain comparatively modest. Both 
the commercial banks and their supervisors at the central banks had 
difficulty adapting to these  change^.^ 
7. Earlier studies have stressed the role of rapid increases in bank lending as a predictor 
of subsequent financial crisis (e.g., Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996). 
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Table 4.11 Money and Credit, 1990-96 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Indonesia 
M2 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Claims on private sector 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Malaysia 
M2 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Claims on private sector 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Philippines 
M2 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Claims on private sector 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Thailand 
M2 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Claims on private sector 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
South Korea 
M2 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
Claims on private sector 
Share of GDP 
Annual growth rate 
43.3 
50.6 
66.2 
34.1 
19.3 
69.8 
83.1 
38.3 
102.5 
43.7 
17.5 
50.7 
16.7 
69.3 
16.9 
34.5 
17.3 
17.8 
7.3 
72.7 
19.8 
88.6 
22.7 
38.8 
21.9 
103.1 
20.9 
45.8 
19.8 
49.5 
11.4 
78.9 
29.2 
111.4 
36.2 
13.6 
20.6 
25.4 
74.8 
15.6 
98.4 
24.8 
40.0 
14.9 
110.7 
19.6 
43.4 
20.2 
48.9 
25.5 
90.6 
26.6 
113.3 
12.1 
42.1 
27.1 
26.4 
39.6 
78.9 
18.4 
110.8 
26.3 
42.0 
16.6 
121.3 
21.8 
44.9 
20.0 
51.9 
23.0 
88.9 
12.7 
115.0 
16.5 
45.7 
24.4 
29.1 
26.5 
78.5 
12.9 
128.1 
31.2 
43.5 
18.7 
128.8 
21.6 
48.3 
27.2 
53.7 
22.6 
92.7 
20.0 
129.6 
29.7 
50.4 
24.2 
37.5 
45.2 
80.8 
17.0 
142.0 
26.0 
43.7 
15.6 
133.5 
19.2 
52.5 
27.2 
55.8 
21.4 
97.8 
21.8 
144.6 
28.9 
54.0 
23.2 
48.6 
48.7 
79.9 
12.6 
141.9 
13.7 
45.7 
15.8 
140.9 
17.0 
Apparently much of this credit headed for speculative investments in 
real estate markets rather than into increasing productive capacity for 
manufactured exports as in earlier periods. Although official data show 
only a small share of private bank credit for real estate, these figures 
probably understate the true amount, as firms apparently diverted their 
own working capital and other loans toward real estate. The weaknesses 
of these financial systems were widely recognized and discussed, both in 
and out of official circles. We note, for example, the cover story of an April 
1993 edition of the Far East Economic Review-published more than four 
years before the crisis-which wondered aloud whether Indonesia’s new 
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cabinet would “fix the banks.” But little action was taken to strengthen 
the banks, and some policy changes (e.g., the establishment of the BIBF) 
actually weakened the system further. 
At least part of the expansion in private credit was ultimately financed 
by commercial bank offshore borrowing. Partial financial liberalization in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s gave banks much more latitude to act as 
financial intermediaries and channel foreign money into domestic enter- 
prises. In the Philippines, foreign liabilities of commercial banks skyrock- 
eted from 5.5 to 17.2 percent of GDP between 1993 and 1996 and contin- 
ued to grow rapidly through the middle of 1997 (table 4.12). In Thailand, 
these liabilities jumped even more sharply, from 5.9 percent of GDP in 
1992 to 28.4 percent of GDP in 1995. Indeed, the net foreign assets of the 
Thai banking system fell from 14 percent in 1993 to zero in 1995. In Ma- 
laysia, foreign liabilities of the banking sector grew rapidly to peak at 19.5 
percent of GDP in 1993, before falling off sharply by 1996. These liabilities 
did not grow as rapidly in Indonesia, where much of the offshore bor- 
rowing was undertaken directly by private firms, without using domestic 
banks as intermediaries (hence the somewhat smaller build-up in commer- 
cial bank credit to the private sector in Indonesia). Nonetheless, the risks 
to the Indonesian economy were similar: rupiah revenue streams were ex- 
pected to repay dollar liabilities, leaving these firms exposed to significant 
exchange rate risks. 
The sharp increase in foreign borrowing by domestic banks and private 
corporations is evident from data from the BIS, as we saw earlier in table 
4.3. Total obligations to foreign banks of the five countries grew from $210 
billion to $260 billion in 1996 alone. Obligations by the banking sector 
jumped from $91 billion to $1 15 billion, even after foreign bank lending 
to Thai banks had leveled off because of growing concerns about the Thai 
financial system. Particularly significant is the sharp increase in short-term 
debt, especially in Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea. Short-term debts 
owed to banks by these three countries reached $147 billion in 1996. Of 
course, the actual amount of short-term liabilities were even larger, since 
these data do not include offshore issues of commercial paper and other 
nonbank liabilities. The use of short-term foreign currency borrowing to 
finance domestic investments in real estate and other nontradable activi- 
ties was particularly dangerous. Banks became increasingly vulnerable for 
at least two reasons. First, by borrowing in foreign exchange and lending 
in local currencies, the banks were exposed to the risk of foreign exchange 
losses from a depreciation. Even if the domestic loans were denominated 
in dollars, borrowers who were not earning foreign exchange (e.g., real 
estate) faced bankruptcy in the event of depreciation. Second, to the ex- 
tent that banks borrowed offshore in short-term maturities and lent on- 
shore with longer payback periods, they were exposed to the risk of a run. 
A particularly telling indicator of these risks is the ratio of short-term 
debt to foreign exchange reserves. Essentially, this measure compares a 
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Table 4.12 Net Foreign Assets of Banking System, 1990-96 (share of GDP) 
Country 1990 1991 
Indonesia 
Foreign assets of banking 
system, net 
Monetary authorities, net 
Deposit money banks, net 
Foreign assets 
Foreign liabilities 
Malaysia 
Foreign assets of banking 
system, net 
Monetary authorities, net 
Deposit money banks, net 
Foreign assets 
Foreign liabilities 
Philippines 
Foreign assets of banking 
system, net 
Monetary authorities, net 
Deposit money banks, net 
Foreign assets 
Foreign liabilities 
Thailand 
Foreign assets of banking 
system, net 
Monetary authorities, net 
Deposit money banks, net 
Foreign assets 
Foreign liabilities 
Korea 
Foreign assets of banking 
system, net 
Monetary authorities, net 
Deposit money banks, net 
Foreign assets 
Foreign liabilities 
5.4 7.6 
5.9 8.0 
-0.5 -0.4 
6.0 4.9 
6.5 5.2 
22.1 18.7 
23.3 23.5 
-1.3 -4.8 
5.8 4.3 
7.0 9.1 
-9.1 -1.5 
-13.0 -5.5 
4.0 4.0 
10.2 8.4 
6.2 4.4 
14.0 16.4 
16.5 18.5 
-2.4 -2.0 
2.6 2.9 
5.0 4.9 
5.7 3.8 
6.0 4.9 
-0.3 -1.1 
3.8 3.8 
4.1 4.9 
1992 
- 
11.4 
12.6 
-1.2 
5.0 
6.2 
23.0 
32.2 
3.6 
12.7 
-9.2 
2.6 
3.1 
8.7 
5.6 
-0.6 
15.9 
19.0 
-3.2 
2.7 
5.9 
5.1 
5.7 
-0.6 
4.2 
4.8 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
8.6 
11.4 
-2.8 
3.4 
6.2 
34.3 
47.3 
-13.0 
6.5 
19.5 
7.4 
3.8 
3.5 
9.0 
5.5 
14.3 
20.4 
-6.1 
5.0 
11.1 
6.6 
6.2 
0.4 
4.9 
4.5 
6.4 
9.5 
-3.1 
3.4 
6.5 
33.2 
36.7 
-3.5 
5.7 
9.2 
7.4 
5.4 
2.0 
8.7 
6.7 
4.1 
21.0 
- 16.9 
4.7 
21.6 
6.7 
6.8 
-0.1 
5.4 
5.5 
6.7 
8.9 
-2.2 
3.8 
6.0 
27.2 
29.8 
-2.6 
4.8 
7.4 
6.2 
6.2 
-0.0 
8.8 
8.8 
0.0 
22.7 
-22.6 
5.8 
28.4 
6.4 
7.2 
-0.8 
6.1 
6.9 
9.6 
11.3 
-1.7 
3.9 
5.6 
23.7 
28.2 
-4.9 
4.4 
9.2 
3.2 
10.6 
9.8 
17.2 
-1.4 
-1.7 
21.2 
-22.9 
3.9 
26.8 
5.2 
7.2 
-2.0 
7.3 
9.3 
country’s short-term foreign liabilities to its liquid foreign assets available 
to service those liabilities in the event of a creditor run. Table 4.13 shows 
this ratio for a large number of countries in mid-1994 (on the eve of the 
Mexican crisis) and mid-1997 (the onset of the Asian crisis). Mexico and 
Argentina each had short-term debt in excess of foreign exchange reserves 
in 1994, indicating their vulnerability to a crisis. In mid-1 997 in Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Korea-the three countries most severely afflicted by the 
crisis-short-term debt also exceeded available foreign exchange reserves. 
It is also instructive to note that the ratio exceeded 1.0 in several other 
countries that were not affected by the crisis (including the Asian countries 
in 1994). This suggests that short-term debt in excess of reserves does not 
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Table 4.13 Short-Term Debt and Reserves, 1994 and 1997 (million dollars) 
June 1994 June 1997 
Short- Short- 
Short- Term Short- Term 
Term Debt/ Term Debtl 
Country Debt Reserves Reserves Debt Reserves Reserves 
Argentina 17,557 13,247 1.325 23,891 19,740 1.210 
Brazil 28,976 41,292 0.702 44,223 55,849 0.792 
Chile 5,447 10,766 0.506 7,615 17,017 0.447 
Colombia 3,976 7,718 0.515 6,698 9,940 0.674 
India 5,062 16,725 0.303 7,145 25,702 0.301 
Indonesia 18,822 10,915 1.724 34,661 20,336 1.704 
Jordan 647 1,291 0.501 582 1,624 0.358 
Korea 35,204 21,685 1.623 70,182 34,070 2.060 
Malaysia 8,203 32,608 0.252 16,268 26,588 0.612 
Mexico 28,404 16,509 1.721 28,226 23,775 1.187 
Pakistan 1,708 2,307 0.740 3,047 1,249 2.440 
Peru 2,157 5,611 0.384 5,368 10,665 0.503 
Philippines 2,646 6,527 0.405 8,293 9,781 0.848 
South Africa 7,108 475 14.964 13,247 4,241 3.124 
Sri Lanka 51 1 1,983 0.258 414 1,770 0.234 
Thailand 27,151 27,375 0.992 45,567 31,361 1.453 
Turkey 8,821 4,279 2.061 13,067 16,055 0.814 
Venezuela 4,382 5,422 0.808 3,629 13,215 0.275 
Zimbabwe 704 534 1.319 73 1 447 1.635 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (1998) and International Monetary Fund (various issues). 
Taiwan 17,023 90,143 0.189 21,966 90,025 0.244 
necessarily cause a crisis but renders a country vulnerable to a financial 
panic. Once a crisis starts, each creditor knows that there are not enough 
liquid foreign exchange reserves for each short-term creditor to be fully 
paid, so each rushes to be the first in line to demand full repayment. Under 
normal circumstances, short-term debts can be easily rolled over. How- 
ever, once creditors begin to believe that the other creditors are no longer 
willing to roll over the debt, each of them will try to call in their loans 
ahead of other investors, so as not to be the one left without repayment 
out of the limited supply of foreign exchange reserves. Even sound corpo- 
rations may be unable to roll over their debts. Countries with large foreign 
exchange reserves relative to short-term debt (e.g., Taiwan) are much less 
vulnerable to panics since each creditor can rest assured that sufficient 
funds are available to meet his claims. 
4.4.5 
Summarizing the findings of this section, we note the following. First, 
the crisis was not predicted by most market participants and analysts. This 
Predictability and Explanation of the Crisis 
The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis 133 
fact is supported by data on capital flows, risk premiums, credit ratings, 
IMF reports, and other indicators. The biggest warnings came in Thai- 
land, where the expectations of currency depreciation grew markedly in 
1996 and early 1997. Korea also gave off increasing warnings. There were 
few if any alarm bells in Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines. Second, 
traditional warning signs (current account deficits, overvalued exchange 
rates, export growth) gave some reasons for concern, but the signals were 
muted and generally ignored (see table 4.14). While East Asian currencies 
had appreciated in real terms in the 1990s, the real appreciation was con- 
siderably less than in most of Latin America. Current account deficits 
were very high in Thailand and Malaysia in 1996, but considerably lower 
in Indonesia and Korea. Malaysia’s current account deficit had declined 
markedly in 1996 compared with the preceding year. 
The biggest indicators of risk were financial but were generally ignored. 
Short-term debts to international banks had risen to high levels relative to 
foreign exchange reserves in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Domestic 
claims on the private sector (measured as a percentage of GDP) had also 
risen significantly, suggesting growing strains in the banking sector. This 
was especially the case in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and 
much less so in Indonesia and Korea. These indicators show some growing 
weaknesses and point to the need for moderate adjustments in the Asian 
economies. These imbalances, however, were not large enough to warrant 
a crisis of the magnitude that has been seen in Asia. 
Perhaps the most notable fact, however, is that these financial indicators 
show the vulnerability to crisis but do not guarantee the onset of crisis. 
They seem to be, in short, necessary but not sufficient conditions. In 1994, 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand already had ratios of short-term debt to 
foreign exchange reserves well in excess of 1.0, but they were not hit by 
the “tequila” shock. In 1997, South Africa evinces major vulnerabilities 
to panic but, fortunately, without an episode of panic. These patterns may 
indeed be the best confirmation of the multiple-equilibrium character of 
financial panics: we can identify conditions of vulnerability, and the need 
for modest adjustments, but we cannot predict the actual onset of crisis, 
since the crisis requires a triggering event that leads short-term creditors 
to expect the flight of other short-term creditors. 
4.5 The Evolution of the Crisis 
4.5.1 Triggering Events 
The cracks began to appear at almost the same time in Korea and Thai- 
land in early 1997. In January, Hanbo Steel collapsed under $6 billion in 
debts. Hanbo was the first bankruptcy of a Korean chaebol in a decade. In 
the months that followed, Sammi Steel and Kia Motors suffered a similar 
Table 4.14 Selected Crisis Indicators 
Financial Institution 
Real Claims on Private Sbr-t-Term Debt/ 
Current Account/ Capital Account/ Exchange Rate Sector/GDP ("h) Reserves 
GDP (9'0) GDP (Oh) (1990 = 100) 
Country 1996 1996 1996 I990 1996 June 1994 June 1997 
Argentina -1.4 2.5 44 15.6 '1;.4 1.3 I .2 
Brazil -2.1 4.4a 20 40.8 30.7 0.7 0.8 
Chile -4.1 8.8 61 47.0 57.0 0.5 0.4 
Colombia -5.5 7.9 - 30.8 41.2 0.5 0.7 
India -1.6 3.1* ~ 26.8 24.7 0.3 0.3 
Indonesia -3.5 4.9 80 5 C  .6 55.4 1.7 1.7 
Jordan -3.1 5.4 - 04.4 65.3 0.5 0.4 
Korea -4.8 4.8 88 56.8 65.7 1.6 2.1 
Malaysia -5.3 9.4 78 71.4 144.6 0.3 0.6 
Mexico -0.6 1.2 95 22.7 21.6 1.7 1.2 
Pakistan -5.6 4.1n - 27.1 26.7 0.7 2.4 
Peru -5.9 5.1 ~ 10.1 19.6 0.4 0.5 
Philippines -4.3 11 .o 0 19.3 48.4 0.4 0.8 
South Africa -1.6 2.1 - 85.0 137.7 15.0 3.1 
Sri Lanka -4.7 4.2 ~ 19.6 25.2 0.3 0.2 
Taiwan 4.4 -4.0 - 97.0 165.0 0.2 0.2 
-8.0 10.6 80 83.1 141.9 1 .o 1.5 
Turkey "_" 5.0 ~ 16.7 23.5 2.1 0.8 
Thailand 
Venezuela 13.1 -2.6 - 25.4 9.6 0.8 0.3 
Zimbabwe ~ - 23.0 31.2 1.3 1.6 
Sources: Ba .K for International Settlements (l998), International Monetary Fund (various issues), authors' calculations. 
"1995 d? d. 
.  
- 
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fate. These bankruptcies, in turn, put several merchant banks under sig- 
nificant pressure, since much of the foreign borrowing of these companies 
had been, in effect, channeled through (and in some cases guaranteed by) 
the merchant banks. In Thailand, Samprasong Land missed payments due 
on its foreign debt in early February, signaling the fall in the property 
markets and the beginning of the end of the financial companies that had 
lent heavily to property companies. During the ensuing six months, the 
Bank of Thailand lent over Bt 200 billion ($8 billion) to distressed finan- 
cial institutions through its Financial Institutions Development Fund 
(FIDF). As concerns began to mount, the Bank of Thailand also commit- 
ted almost all of its liquid foreign exchange reserves in forward contracts, 
much of it to speculators who correctly guessed that the combination of 
slow export growth and financial distress would ultimately require a deval- 
uation. By late June, net forward sales of reserves approximately equaled 
gross reserves. This does not mean that the central bank had run out of 
usable reserves (since the open forward positions could be closed at a par- 
tial, not complete, loss), but usable reserve levels had fallen sharply. In late 
June 1997, the Thai government removed support from a major finance 
company, Finance One, announcing that creditors (including foreign cred- 
itors) would incur losses, contrary to previous announcements and market 
expectations. This shock accelerated the withdrawal of foreign funds and 
prompted the currency depreciation on 2 July 1997. In turn, the Thai baht 
devaluation triggered the capital outflows from the rest of East Asia. 
The proximate causes of the withdrawal differed somewhat across the 
region: 
Bunk failure. The failures of finance companies in Thailand and the bank 
closures in Indonesia helped set off the exodus. 
Corporate fuilure. In Korea, the withdrawal of funds was based on con- 
cerns about the health of the corporate sector. 
Political uncertainty. In Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, 
political uncertainty hastened the credit withdrawals, since each coun- 
try faced a potential change in government. (Korea and Thailand have 
both changed governments since the onset of the crisis. A new president 
will be elected in the Philippines in May 1998. Elections are scheduled 
for mid-March 1998 in Indonesia, though with no chance of a change 
through the ballot box. Suharto’s weakening health, along with the ab- 
sence of a clear successor, and growing discomfort with the economic 
role played by the president’s family-rather than the president’s elec- 
toral vulnerability-are the notable features of Indonesian political un- 
certainty.) 
Contagion. Many creditors appeared to treat the region as a whole and 
assumed that if Thailand was in trouble, the other countries in the re- 
gion probably had similar difficulties. Part of the contagion effect was 
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the sudden loss of government credibility throughout the region. After 
all, the Thai government had pledged for months that Finance One was 
in good shape, that plenty of foreign exchange reserves were available, 
and that the baht would not be devalued. Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia were all hit hard by contagion effects. 
International interventions. Although at times the IMF can help restore 
confidence in battered economies, it can also send a signal to creditors 
of impending crisis, leading to an accelerated outflow of foreign funds. 
This depends especially on the specific measures that the IMF recom- 
mends. In the case of the Asian programs, the IMF recommended im- 
mediate suspensions or closures of financial institutions, measures that 
actually helped to incite panic. 
The withdrawal of foreign funds triggered a chain reaction that quickly 
developed into a financial panic. The exchange rate depreciations associ- 
ated with the withdrawals themselves sparked new withdrawals of foreign 
exchange, as domestic borrowers with unhedged currency positions rushed 
to buy dollars. Throughout Southeast Asia, few firms had hedged their ex- 
posure, since they believed that their governments would retain stable ex- 
change rates. In addition, most central banks required that firms seek 
prior approval before undertaking any hedging, making it somewhat more 
burdensome for firms to cover their risks (this was not the case, however, 
in Indonesia). At the same time, as currencies depreciated, foreign lenders 
became more concerned that their customers would be unable to repay 
their debts and began to call in their loans, reinforcing the depreciation. 
The withdrawal of funds also set off a liquidity squeeze and a sharp rise 
in interest rates. As a result, firms that were profitable before the crisis 
found it difficult to obtain working capital or to remain profitable with 
significantly higher interest rates. Offshore creditors became concerned 
about the profitability of their customers and grew increasingly reluctant 
to roll over short-term loans. The lack of clear bankruptcy laws and work- 
out mechanisms added to the withdrawal of credit, since foreign lenders 
feared they would have little recourse to collect on bad loans. The banking 
system quickly came under intense pressure. Nonperforming loans rose 
quickly, and depositors withdrew their funds either out of concern over the 
safety of the banking system or in order to meet pressing foreign exchange 
obligations. The losses on foreign exchange exposure and the rise in non- 
performing loans eroded the capital base of the banks, adding to their 
stress. In Korea, the fall in the stock market exacerbated the erosion of 
the capital base, since banks were allowed to hold some of the capital as 
equity in other companies. As a result, even liquid banks were constrained 
in their ability to make loans, as they struggled to stay ahead of the mini- 
mum capital adequacy standards. 
The rapid evolution into panic was aided by policy misjudgments and 
mistakes across the region. Had Thailand responded to the fall in property 
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prices in early 1997 by floating the baht and moderately tightening mone- 
tary and fiscal policies, the Asian financial crisis could have been largely 
avoided. Thailand and Korea, of course, made the paramount mistake of 
trying to defend their exchange rate pegs until they had effectively ex- 
hausted a substantial proportion of their foreign exchange reserves. In 
Indonesia, state enterprises were instructed to withdraw a sizable portion 
of their deposits from the banking system and to purchase central bank 
notes, adding to the intense liquidity squeeze and driving up interest rates. 
Large investment projects of dubious economic value were postponed, 
then given the go-ahead, then postponed again in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia, adding to the confusion. Malaysia and Thailand introduced 
mild controls on foreign exchange transactions. Malaysia announced the 
formation of a large fund to be used to prop up stock prices then aban- 
doned the plan a few days later. Thailand and Korea injected large sums 
into failing financial institutions, opening a large hole into what had pre- 
viously been prudent fiscal positions. Inflammatory statements by govern- 
ment officials and market participants alike (especially the well-known 
exchanges between the Malaysian prime minister and George Soros) fur- 
ther frayed nerves and added to the panicked withdrawal of funds. 
Once the trigger was pulled, several powerful feedback mechanisms am- 
plified the withdrawal into a panic. Undercapitalized Japanese banks with 
heavy exposure in the rest of Asia felt further downward pressure on their 
balance sheets as a result of the emerging crisis and therefore began to call 
in loans. Similarly, Korean banks with extensive exposure in Southeast 
Asia began to call in loans as a result of the Korean crisis. Downgrades 
by the major rating agencies led to new rounds of withdrawals. 
The regional crisis intensified and threatened to spread when the Hong 
Kong dollar came under attack in November as a result of currency depre- 
ciations in the rest of Asia and the consequent loss of trade competitive- 
ness in Hong Kong itself. Hong Kong banks faced steeply rising interest 
rates on liabilities, and it is likely that they reacted in part by calling in 
loans from the rest of Asia (data on Hong Kong bank loans to the rest of 
Asia are not publicly available). Moreover, the attack on Hong Kong 
strongly indicated the potential for the crisis to cross international bor- 
ders, and fears rose that the problems would spread through the rest of 
Asia and beyond. Indeed, the New Taiwan dollar also came under pres- 
sure and fell sharply, despite Taiwan’s huge stock of reserves. These events 
almost certainly accelerated withdrawals from Southeast Asia, and espe- 
cially Korea. 
4.5.2 Contagion, Panic, and Crisis in Indonesia 
The extent of the crisis in Indonesia calls for special comment, since at 
this writing it is the country that has been hardest hit in the region. This 
outcome is in many ways ironic, since at the outset many observers 
thought it would be the least affected country, and in the early stages Indo- 
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nesia was praised for taking quick and concerted action.8 Indonesia ap- 
pears to be the clearest case of contagion in the region. Of course, there 
were many problems and weaknesses in the Indonesian economy before 
the crisis, including undersupervised banks, extensive crony capitalism, 
corruption, monopoly power, and growing short-term debt, some of which 
at least one of us has discussed previo~sly.~ Yet by most measures, Indone- 
sia’s imbalances were among the least severe in the region and clearly were 
much less dramatic than those in Thailand. Consider the following: 
The current account deficit, at 3.5 percent of GDP, was the lowest of the 
Asian-5 countries, 
Export growth in 1996 of 10.4 percent, while down from the 1995 level of 
I3 percent, was the second highest in the region. 
The budget had been in surplus by an average of over 1 percent of GDP 
for four years. 
Credit growth had remained at more modest levels than elsewhere in the 
region. 
Foreign liabilities of the commercial banks, at 5.6 percent of GDP, were 
substantially below those of the other affected economies (although cor- 
porate foreign debts were high). 
There had been no major corporate bankruptcies, and the stock market 
continued to rise strongly through early 1997 until the onset of the crisis 
in Thailand. 
Indonesia was applauded early on for first widening the rupiah’s trading 
band to 12 percent and then moving to a float without spending its foreign 
exchange reserves in a futile defense of the currency. When the rupiah did 
come under severe attack in August, problems arose when the government 
abruptly raised interest rates, which had the effect of intensifying short- 
run pressure. The government’s decision to cancel 150 investment projects 
was designed to be a bold attempt to restore international confidence, but 
the reversal of the decision just a few days later for 15 of the largest pro- 
jects undermined the strategy and simply added to the confusion. By early 
September Indonesia had joined Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
in the crisis. 
Nonetheless, since reserve levels remained strong at well over $20 bil- 
lion, Indonesia did not seem an obvious candidate for an TMF program.’O 
When Indonesia signed its first IMF program on 31 October, the rupiah 
8. See, e.g., “In Battle for Investors, This Is No Contest: Amid a Crisis, Indonesia Opens 
Up and Thrives as Malaysia Stumbles,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 5-6 September 1997. 
9. Radelet (1995) raises concerns about “quasi-public sector” foreign liabilities of well- 
connected Indonesian firms and rising short-term debt, while Radelet (1996) documents the 
overvaluation of the rupiah. 
10. McLeod (1997) argues that an IMF program was not necessary, a conclusion with 
which we agree. 
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immediately strengthened as a result of large concerted interventions by 
Japan and Singapore. Yet the boost in the rupiah was very short lived. As 
the impact of abrupt bank closures and the ensuing bank runs (discussed 
in the next section), higher interest rates, and decapitalization of the banks 
set in, the rupiah depreciated by 23 percent and the stock market fell by 
19 percent (in rupiah terms) between 3 November and 4 December. The 
slide was augmented by confusion over the bank closures, since two of the 
president's relatives publicly balked (and threatened legal action) when 
their banks were ordered closed. (This event illustrates one of the dangers 
of hasty bank closures-such abrupt institutional changes are almost al- 
ways poorly thought through and badly implemented, thereby creating a 
sense of confusion and panic rather than building confidence.) Quite sud- 
denly, within a couple of weeks of the start of the IMF program, Indonesia 
began to look even weaker than its neighbors. 
In December, the effects of the severest drought in many years set in, 
with food prices rising and food shortages emerging in some parts of the 
archipelago. The drought complicated the task of crisis management enor- 
mously (both economically and politically), since food prices jumped 
sharply, the foreign exchange costs of food imports rose, and displaced 
urban day laborers could not easily return to rural areas to find work. At 
the same time, world petroleum prices fell, sharply reducing Indonesia's 
export receipts, adding to pressure on the exchange rate. 
On 4 December, Korea signed its IMF program, adding a new round 
of uncertainty to the entire region. Then, on 5 December, it was an- 
nounced that President Suharto was ill and had to cancel a foreign trip. 
Markets dropped precipitously, accelerating a fall that had been under 
way for a month. The prospect of a severe illness or death of Suharto, 
with no clear presidential successor in sight, added to the ongoing panic. 
By early January, Indonesia had become the pariah of the region, with the 
IMF and industrialized country governments publicly blasting a proposed 
budget (which, on later inspection, turned out to be far less onerous than 
initially described)." Indonesia's waffling on promised structural reforms 
and its flirtation with the ill-advised notion of introducing a currency 
board only added to negative perceptions of the country. At this point, 
the crisis in Indonesia has become as much political as economic. (Note 
that both Thailand and Korea each received a boost from a change in 
government, whereas there seemed little prospect of political change in 
Indonesia.) The economic and political issues have fed off each other, add- 
ing a whole new dimension to the dynamics of the panic. 
11.  The international community severely criticized the proposed 32 percent increase in 
spending as indicating that Indonesia was not serious about reform, which sent markets 
reeling. However, all of the increase was simply due to exchange rate movements. Within 
three weeks the Fund had quietly approved a new budget with a 46 percent increase in 
spending, but the damage to market perceptions had been done. 
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Indonesia’s extensive meltdown is far more severe than can be ac- 
counted for by flaws in economic fundamentals, since those were not espe- 
cially bad. The “moral hazard cum bubble” model seems to be even less 
appropriate for Indonesia than for Thailand and Korea (where it is also 
an exaggeration of fundamental weaknesses). To reiterate in the case of 
Indonesia, most foreign lending was to private firms, and not to banks. 
While many of these companies may have been assumed to have implicit 
government backing, much of the lending to corporations was surely un- 
protected by government guarantees and was seen in that light. There was 
also no sign of market concern about a growing crisis, since the stock 
market and other indexes performed very strongly right up until early July. 
International credit ratings remained high and positive, and international 
banks continued to lend, well after they had cut back on loans to Thailand 
and Korea. In short, Indonesia seems to be a clear case of contagion lead- 
ing to panic, and ultimately to a severe, unnecessary economic contrac- 
tion. 
4.6 The IMF Programs 
One month after Thailand floated the baht, it announced on 5 August 
a policy reform package that had been formulated in cooperation with 
the IMF. The thirty-four-month, $17.2 billion standby arrangement was 
approved by the Fund board on 20 August. The IMF contributed $4 bil- 
lion, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) $2.7 billion, 
and individual governments the balance of $10.5 billion (including $3.5 
billion from neighboring Southeast Asian countries). Japan contributed 
$4 billion; the United States did not contribute to the package. Indonesia 
followed suit by signing a thirty-six-month, $40 billion package on 31 Oc- 
tober. The IMF contributed $10 billion, the World Bank and the ADB $8 
billion, and other governments the balance (including $5 billion and $3 
billion in a “second line of defense” from Japan and the United States, 
respectively). Somehow, the official figure of $40 billion includes $5 billion 
of “assistance” from Indonesia’s own reserves! Korea signed its $57 billion 
three-year standby on 4 December, with $21 billion from the IMF, $14 
billion from the World Bank and the ADB, and $22 billion from a group 
of industrial countries. With the Philippines continuing its previously 
signed standby program, four of the five afflicted economies came under 
the tutelage of the IMF. 
The IMF programs have had nine main declared goals: 
Prevent outright default on foreign obligations. 
Limit the extent of currency depreciation. 
Preserve a fiscal balance. 
Limit the rise in inflation. 
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Rebuild foreign exchange reserves. 
Restructure and reform the banking sector. 
Remove monopolies and otherwise reform the domestic nonfinancial 
Preserve confidence and creditworthiness. 
Limit the decline of output. 
To achieve these objectives, the programs have been based on six key pol- 
icy components: 
Fiscalpolicy. The IMF placed fiscal contraction at the very heart of the 
programs. For example, the official press release on the Thai program 
states that “fiscal policy is the key to the overall credibility of the pro- 
gram.” The press release on Indonesia similarly put fiscal policy at the 
forefront: “First, the authorities will maintain tight fiscal and monetary 
policies.” The objectives of fiscal contraction were to (1) support the 
monetary contraction and defend the exchange rate and (2) provide 
funds necessary to inject into the financial system. 
Bank closures. In Thailand, 58 out of 91 finance companies were immedi- 
ately suspended, and 56 of these were eventually liquidated. In Indo- 
nesia, 16 commercial banks were closed. In Korea, 14 (of 30) merchant 
banks were suspended. The goals of these actions were to limit the 
losses being accumulated by these institutions and to send a strong sig- 
nal that governments were serious about implementing reforms in order 
to restore confidence in the banking system. 
Enforcement of capital-adequacy standards. While banks were facing rapid 
decapitalization because of losses on foreign exchange exposure and an 
increase in nonperforming loans, the initial Fund programs pushed for 
a rapid recapitalization. The goal was to return the banking system to 
a solid footing as quickly as possible. 
Tight domestic credit. Through contractionary base money targets, the 
IMF programs raised interest rates and reduced domestic credit avail- 
ability. The purpose was to defend the exchange rate. 
Debt repayment. Foreign exchange targets in each program provide for full 
payment of foreign debt obligations, backed by “bailout funds” mobi- 
lized by the IMF. 
Nonjinancial structural changes. In each program, structural reforms were 
included that aimed at reducing tariffs, opening sectors to foreign in- 
vestment, and reducing monopoly powers. 
The three original programs failed to meet their objectives, and none of 
the programs lasted in its original form for more than a few weeks. New 
letters of intent were signed with Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia on 25 
November, 24 December, and 1 5 January, respectively. Currency deprecia- 
tion and stock market collapse continued long after the programs were 
economy. 
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signed, and there was no sign of an immediate restoration of confidence. 
Bank closures in Thailand and Indonesia added to the sense of financial 
panic, rather than stemming the outflow. Output is now projected to fall 
much more sharply than originally targeted, and the original targets for 
inflation and exchange rates have been revised. Credit ratings collapsed in 
each country after the agreements were in place. 
The Fund has attributed this continuing decline mainly to unexpected 
contagion effects, political uncertainty, and poor implementation of the 
programs by the governments in the region. There is clearly some truth in 
these observations. Korea’s collapse made matters worse in Indonesia and 
Thailand, Suharto’s health and the elections in Korea created market jit- 
ters, and each government has stopped short of full implementation of 
agreed reforms. But there are several reasons to believe that the underlying 
design of the programs added to, rather than ameliorated, the panic. Four 
areas, in particular, are open to question. 
1. Bunk Closures. There is no question that many financial institutions 
in the region were unviable and needed to be merged or liquidated. The 
appropriate question is, How should this be done, and over what time 
frame, in the midst of a financial panic? Abruptly shutting financial insti- 
tutions without a more comprehensive program for financial sector re- 
form, as was done in Thailand and Indonesia, only served to deepen the 
panic. With no deposit insurance in place, the hastily arranged closures 
predictably ignited bank runs, with depositors in other institutions fearing 
that their banks would be next in line.’* The closures added to the ongoing 
liquidity squeeze, making it more difficult for banks to continue their nor- 
mal lending operations. Since it was not immediately clear how the for- 
eign liabilities of these banks would be handled, foreign creditors of 
other banks became more reluctant to roll over their loans, adding to the 
squeeze. 
Kindleberger offers some close historical analogies: 
Apart from lags and mistakes of discount policy, the authorities may 
precipitate panic by brusque action in early stages of distress. In the 
summer of 1836, with credit extended in acceptances drawn by Ameri- 
can houses on British joint-stock banks, the Bank of England refused 
to discount any bills bearing the name of a joint-stock bank, and spe- 
cifically instructed its Liverpool agent not to rediscount any paper 
12. Two aspects of the bank closures added to the panic. First. regarding deposits at the 
sixteen banks closed in early November, the Indonesian government announced that ac- 
counts would be protected in the closed banks only up to 20 million rupiah (or around $7,000 
at the time). This protection was not extended to deposits in banks that remained open. 
Second, the very fact that the president’s son’s bank was one that was closed quickly gave 
rise to the view in Indonesia that no bank was safe. The attempt to show “toughness” and 
political resolve backfired, by dramatically undermining confidence in the entire banking 
system. 
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of the so-called “W banks” (Wiggins, Wildes, and Wilson) among the 
seven American banks in Britain, an action that “seemed vindictive” 
and led immediately to panic. As it turned out, the Bank of England 
had to reverse its policies. It had long conferences with the “W banks” 
in October, extended them lines of discount in the first quarter of 1837, 
but failed to prevent their failure in June of that year. The Bank’s in- 
stinct was right: to frustrate the extension of dangerous credit. But 
credit is a dangerous thing. Expectations can quickly be altered. Some- 
thing, sometimes almost nothing, causes a shadow to fall on credit, re- 
verses expectations, and the rush for liquidity is on. (1996, 96) 
The vulnerability of expectations to such sharp shifts from “almost noth- 
ing” results from the condition of multiple equilibria that we have stressed 
throughout this essay. Creditor runs are self-fulfilling. 
A far better approach would have been to implement a longer term, 
more comprehensive strategy for bank restructuring, rather than a quick 
show of force designed simply to demonstrate resolve. Problem banks 
could have been put under some form of receivership, which would have 
protected depositors and allowed good borrowers continued access to 
credit. 
The IMF appears to have recognized the error in its bank closure strat- 
egy. According to press reports, a confidential IMF document reviewing 
the first standby arrangement with Indonesia concluded that “these clo- 
sures, however, far from improving public confidence in the banking sys- 
tem, have instead set off a renewed ‘flight to safety.’” The report found 
that Indonesians had withdrawn $2 billion from the banking system and 
shifted funds from private to state-owned banks, which depositors felt 
offered stronger guarantees. The report concluded that by the end of No- 
vember, two-thirds of Indonesia’s banks “had experienced runs on their 
 deposit^."'^ The text of Indonesia’s second agreement with the Fund re- 
inforced the point: 
Following the closure of 16 insolvent banks in November last year, cus- 
tomers concerned about the safety of private banks have been shifting 
sizeable amounts of deposits to state and foreign banks, while some 
have been withdrawing funds from the banking system entirely. These 
movements in deposits have greatly complicated the task of monetary 
policy, because they have led to a bifurcation of the banking system. By 
mid-November, a large number of banks were facing growing liquidity 
shortages, and were unable to obtain sufficient funds in the interbank 
market to cover this gap, even after paying interest rates ranging up to 
75 percent.l4 
13. “IMF Now Admits Tactics in Indonesia Deepened the Crisis,” New York Times, 14 
14. “Indonesia-Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies,” Jakarta Post, 17 
January 1998. 
January 1998. 
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The memorandum continues at a later stage by observing that “the contin- 
ued depreciation of the rupiah, the slowdown in growth, and high interest 
rates since then have led to a marked deterioration of the financial condi- 
tion of the remaining banks. This deterioration has been exacerbated by 
deposit runs and capital flight, forcing many banks to increasingly resort 
to central bank liquidity support.” 
The Fund program in Korea focused on merchant banks (which do not 
take household deposits) rather than commercial banks. Nonetheless, the 
sudden closure of fourteen merchant banks and the IMF’s insistence on a 
rapid tightening of bank capital adequacy ratios added to the sense of 
panic over the financial system. As in Indonesia, depositors and foreign 
lenders accelerated their withdrawals from the banking system, while the 
banks cut back on their loans in order to enhance their balance sheets. 
The second-round programs in Thailand and Indonesia include more 
comprehensive financial restructuring plans, although even here the plans 
are not complete. 
2. Bank Recapitalization. There is no question that after the crisis, many 
banks needed to be recapitalized. As mentioned previously, the combina- 
tion of a sharp increase in nonperforming loans at the onset of the crisis 
and the effect of exchange rate movements on the banks’ foreign liability 
positions quickly eroded the capital bases of even the strongest banks. The 
question is, How quickly should banks be pushed to recapitalize, espe- 
cially during times of widespread economic distress? Pushing banks to 
recapitalize within an unrealistic time frame can cause them to sharply 
curtail lending, including otherwise strong banks. This, in turn, can lead 
to a more severe credit crunch, increased distress for private firms, and a 
further rise in nonperforming loans. This seems to be exactly what took 
place in the last few months of 1997. The first two IMF programs, in 
particular, pushed hard for quick recapitalization of the banks. For ex- 
ample, the first Indonesian program required that “the instruction issued 
by the central bank to raise capital adequacy to 9 percent by end-1997, 
and 12 percent by end-2001, will be strictly enforced.” Thus banks were 
initially expected not only to return to their previous capital adequacy 
level of 8 percent but actually to add to their capital. The first Thai pro- 
gram stated that “commercial banks and remaining finance companies 
will be required to raise capital in anticipation of possible further deterio- 
ration in their asset quality. . . . Severely under-capitalized institutions that 
cannot raise their capital to the legally required level will be taken over by 
the FIDF (performance criterion as of November 15, 1997)” The second 
programs in these countries eased the requirements somewhat but were 
still quite strict. The second Thai program required the government to 
establish “timetables for the recapitalization of all undercapitalized finan- 
cial institutions during 1998,” while the second Indonesian program stated 
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that “capital adequacy rules are being enforced within the context of the 
bank restructuring strategy.”1s Only the Korean program initially provided 
for a longer time frame for full enforcement of the capital adequacy stan- 
dards. Private discussions with several bankers in the region revealed un- 
certainty as to how fully and over what time frame these standards would 
be applied, with the result that banks substantially curtailed lending. Had 
more forbearance been given on the capital adequacy ratios early in the 
crisis, with a clear and longer term schedule for otherwise strong banks to 
return to full compliance, the extent of the credit squeeze would have been 
much less severe. 
3. Monetary Policy. There are really two aspects to the IMF’s monetary 
policy, which have not been carefully disentangled. The first is quantitative 
domestic credit targets. In most programs, there are limits to high-powered 
money or central bank credit. The second is interest rate targets, or floors 
on interest rates, which are usually added as prior actions to an IMF pro- 
gram. Both types of policies are highly problematical. The problem with 
quantitative credit targets is that they may directly interfere with the cen- 
tral bank’s lender-of-last-resort function. If the central bank is instructed 
not to provide domestic credit, market participants will know that the 
lender-of-last-resort mechanism has been switched 0% Thus a tightening 
of quantitative credit limits may actually trigger panic by short-term credi- 
tors who come to doubt the ability or willingness of the central bank to 
provide liquidity. As H. S.  Foxwell put it in 1908, “To refuse accommoda- 
tion altogether is always held to be dangerous. . . . The Bank [of England] 
was responsible for the solvency of this crowd of small, ill-managed insti- 
tutions [country banks], but dared not call them to account, on peril of 
provoking a general collapse of credit” (quoted in Kindleberger 1996, 95). 
A closely related but distinct issue is interest rate policy. There is no 
question that following the withdrawal of foreign capital, interest rates 
had to rise. After all, capital flows equivalent to 9 percent were reversed in 
a matter of weeks, leading to an immediate elimination of current account 
deficits across the region. As a result, interest rates rose sharply at the 
outset of the crisis. A sharp economic contraction was inevitable. The 
problem was the IMF’s insistence on raising interest rates even higher and 
demanding a fiscal surplus (see below) on top of the huge withdrawal of 
funds (and shrinking current account deficit) that was already under way. 
These steps led to an unnecessarily harsh economic contraction. 
The IMF instructed the central banks of Indonesia, Korea, and Thai- 
land to drain reserves from the system in order to maintain interest rates 
above certain floors. There is little question that higher interest rates have 
undermined the profitability of banks and private firms in the short run 
15. Bank of Thailand website; Jakarta Post, 17 January 1998. 
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and added to the economic downturn. (Indeed, the passage from the sec- 
ond Indonesian program cited above states that high interest rates contrib- 
uted to a marked deterioration in the financial condition of the banks.) 
The policy question is the effect that higher interest rates might have on 
the exchange rate, and whether any benefits with respect to the exchange 
rate would outweigh the negative effects on short-run production. The 
Fund assumes that higher interest rates will lead to stability or apprecia- 
tion of the currency and that the benefits of currency stabilization out- 
weigh the short-run output costs. For example, Deputy Managing Direc- 
tor Shigemitsu Sugisaki (1998) stated that “we know that higher interest 
rates are likely to hurt the corporate sector, but an appreciation of the 
currency that follows a tightening of monetary conditions would greatly 
benefit those corporations indebted in foreign currency. There is no alter- 
native in the short term. A relaxation of monetary policy would only lead 
to further depreciations of the currencies.” 
Despite sharply higher interest rates, currencies have not appreciated, 
so the supposed benefits of this policy are in question. It is entirely pos- 
sible that in the unique conditions of the midst of a financial panic, raising 
interest rates could have the perverse effect in the very short run of weak- 
ening the currency. Kindleberger has made this point clearly, based on 
historical experience: “Tight money in a given financial center can serve 
either to attract funds or to repel them, depending on the expectations 
that a rise in interest rates generates. With inelastic expectations-no fear 
of crisis or of currency depreciation-an increase in the discount rate at- 
tracts funds from abroad, and helps to provide the cash needed to ensure 
liquidity; with elastic expectations of change-of falling prices, bankrupt- 
cies, or exchange depreciation-raising the discount rate may suggest to 
foreigners the need to take more funds out rather than bring new funds 
in” (1996, 8). 
There is little evidence indeed that higher interest rates have succeeded 
in supporting Southeast Asian currencies during the panic phase of the 
crisis. As figure 4.1 shows, exchange rates continued to plummet after the 
signing of IMF programs (see also fig. 4.2). The exchange rate targets in 
these programs were breached in a matter of days in all three countries. 
Part of the problem was not the interest rate policy but accompanying 
measures: the bank closures almost surely helped to induce a panic that 
simply overwhelmed short-term interest rates. It is possible, though, that 
the interest rate policy itself had the adverse effects that Kindleberger 
notes. Creditors understood that highly leveraged borrowers (whether In- 
donesian conglomerates, Korean chaebols, or banks in all countries) could 
quickly be pushed to insolvency as a result of several months of high inter- 
est rates. Moreover, many kinds of interest-sensitive market participants, 
such as bond traders, are simply not active in Asia’s limited financial mar- 
kets. The key participants were the existing holders of short-term debts, 
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and the important question was whether they would or would not roll over 
their claims. Higher interest rates did not feed directly into these existing 
claims (which were generally floating interest rate notes based on a fixed 
premium over the London Interbank Offer Rate). It is possible, however, 
that by undermining the profitability of their corporate customers, higher 
interest rates discouraged foreign creditors from rolling over their loans. 
4. Fiscal Policy. The Fund initially demanded a fiscal surplus of 1 percent 
of GDP in each country. It is not clear why government budgets were 
made so central to the programs, since fiscal policy had been fairly pru- 
dent across the region and budget profligacy was clearly not the source of 
the crisis. Moreover, while the Fund argued that fiscal contraction was 
necessary to reduce the current account deficit, there was no clear ratio- 
nale provided for why additional contraction was necessary on top of the 
massive contraction that was already automatically taking place in the 
region. The fiscal targets simply added to the contractionary force of the 
crisis, Nor was there any clear analytic basis for the precise figure of 1 
percent of GDP (indeed, the figure appears to have been largely arbitrary). 
Under the circumstances, a small deficit would seem to have been more 
appropriate, funded entirely by foreign exchange inflows in support of the 
program. The Fund also appears to have recognized the inappropriateness 
of the fiscal surplus demanded in the first round of programs. The second 
programs in Indonesia and Korea target a 1 percent deficit and a balanced 
budget, respectively, and recent reports suggest the IMF has rethought 
its position in Thailand and will allow the government to run a small 
deficit. l 6  
4.7 Conclusions and Extensions 
In our interpretation, the East Asian crisis resulted from vulnerability 
to financial panic that arose from certain emerging weaknesses in these 
economies (especially growing short-term debt), combined with a series 
of policy missteps and accidents that triggered the panic. Since we view 
the crisis as a case of multiple equilibria, our hypothesis is that the worst 
of the crisis could have been largely avoided with relatively moderate ad- 
justments and appropriate policy changes. Explanations that attribute the 
entire massive contraction to the inevitable consequences of deep flaws in 
the Asian economies-such as Asian crony capitalism-seem to us to be 
strongly overstated. Without question, there were macroeconomic imbal- 
ances, weak financial institutions, widespread corruption, and inadequate 
legal foundations in each of the affected countries. These problems needed 
attention and correction, and they clearly contributed to the vulnerability 
16. “IMF Concedes Its Conditions for Thailand Were Too Austere,” New York Times, 11 
February 1998. 
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of the Asian economies. However, most of these problems had been well 
known for years, and the Asian-5 countries were able to attract $21 1 bil- 
lion of capital inflows between 1994 and 1996, under the widely known 
conditions of Asian capitalism. To attribute the crisis fully to fundamental 
flaws in the precrisis system is to judge that the global financial system 
is prone to sheer folly or somehow expected to avoid losses despite the 
fundamental flaws. Paul Krugman’s initial explanation of the crisis-that 
investors knew their investments were going to weak borrowers but felt 
protected by explicit and implicit guarantees-also seems to us to be only 
a partial explanation. One obvious reason is that much of the lending was 
directed to private firms that did not enjoy these guarantees. Approxi- 
mately half of the loans by international banks and almost all of the port- 
folio and direct equity investments went to nonbank enterprises for which 
state guarantees were far from assured. This comes to around three-fifths 
of total capital flows to the region. 
Moreover, the actual market participants, by their statements and ac- 
tions (e.g., decisions on credit ratings), while recognizing the flaws in these 
economies, simply did not foresee a crisis, with or without bailouts. It is 
difficult, therefore, to make the case that a crisis of this depth and magni- 
tude was simply an accident waiting to happen. We do not believe that 
such a vicious crisis was necessary nor that its depth should be interpreted 
as an indication of the extent of the underlying economic problems in the 
region. Instead, we believe that a much more moderate adjustment would 
have been possible had appropriate steps been taken in the early stages of 
the crisis. 
We have stressed the role of financial panic to make several points of 
significance for policy analysis. First, capital markets are subject to multi- 
ple equilibria. Second, credit collapses such as those in Asia are not simply 
the end of socially destructive bubbles but also (or even mainly) result in 
the destruction of socially productive output. Third, because of the vul- 
nerability to panic in international markets, there may be a role for an in- 
ternational lender of last resort. Fourth, because of the possibility of panic, 
small events can have large consequences (as in the epigraph at the start 
of the paper). In particular, abrupt actions by domestic and international 
policymakers can gravely worsen an incipient crisis, by helping to trigger 
capital outflow. 
This paper has not addressed several highly pertinent issues in the Asian 
crisis, which are left for a companion paper and future work. First, can we 
say more about the balance between socially productive and unproductive 
investments in Asian in the run-up to the crisis? This involves a detailed 
look at the sectoral allocation of credit and investment. Second, do the 
moral hazards that result from IMF-led bailouts undermine the broad so- 
cial value of such operations? In particular, did the Mexican bailout help 
to prepare the base for the subsequent Asian crisis? Third, how should an 
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incipient financial crisis, centered on weak banks, be managed in order to 
avoid inciting a financial panic? When and how should bad banks be 
closed? Fourth, can orderly workout mechanisms (e.g., rollover negotia- 
tions directly between creditors and debtors, as in the case of Korea) sub- 
stitute for IMF loans, or are loans and orderly workouts in fact comple- 
mentary actions? Fifth, what should be done now in Asia, especially in 
view of the decapitalization of banks throughout the region, which is hin- 
dering production and trade finance throughout the region? Sixth, what 
institutional steps could be taken in the future to reduce the likelihood of 
financial crises of this sort? Is there a case for controls on short-term capi- 
tal movements, and if so, should these be applied country by country or 
also through international mechanisms? 
Appendix 
Summaries of IMF Executive Board discussions on Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand follow. 
Indonesia: Board Discussion, July 1996. “The Board strongly endorsed the 
authorities’ aim to reduce broad money growth in 1996. Directors agreed 
with the authorities’ emphasis on maintaining an open capital account 
and welcomed the steps already taken to widen the exchange-rate band 
and give greater flexibility to exchange rate policy. . . , 
“In the Board’s view, further substantial reforms, including financial 
sector reforms and the development of a strong capital market, were essen- 
tial for maintaining rapid, sustained growth. Directors urged the authori- 
ties to address weaknesses in the banking sector, and in particular to act 
decisively to resolve the problem of insolvent banks and recover non- 
performing loans. They considered these actions as critical to reduce the 
vulnerability of the economy to shocks and to lessen moral hazard.” 
Korea: Board Discussion, November 1996. “In their discussion, Directors 
welcomed Korea’s continued impressive macroeconomic performance: 
growth had decelerated from the unsustainably rapid pace of the previous 
two years, inflation had remained subdued notwithstanding some modest 
pickup in the months prior to the consultation, and the widening of the 
current account deficit largely resulted from a temporary weakening of 
the terms of trade. 
“Directors praised the authorities for their enviable fiscal record and sug- 
gested that fiscal policy could best contribute to strengthening medium- 
term macroeconomic performance by maintaining a strong budgetary 
position as much-needed spending on social overhead capital was under- 
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taken. They also welcomed the recent acceleration of capital account lib- 
eralization; although some Directors agreed with the authorities’ gradual 
approach to capital market liberalization, a number of Directors consid- 
ered that rapid and complete liberalization offered many benefits at Ko- 
rea’s stage of development.” 
Thailand: Board Discussion, July 1996. “Directors strongly praised Thai- 
land’s remarkable economic performance and the authorities’ consistent 
record of sound macroeconomic fundamentals. They noted that financial 
policieshad been tightened in 1995 in response to the widening of the ex- 
ternal current account deficit and the pickup of inflation, and this had 
begun to bear results, but they cautioned that there was no room for com- 
placency. . . . 
“The recent increase in the current account deficit had increased Thai- 
land’s vulnerability to economic shocks and adverse shifts in market 
sentiment. On the one hand, Directors noted, economic fundamentals 
remained generally very strong, characterized by high saving and invest- 
ment, a public sector surplus, strong export growth in recent years, and 
manageable debt and debt-service returns. On the other hand, the level of 
short-term capital inflows and short-term debt were somewhat high. Also, 
the limitations of present policy instruments constrained the authorities’ 
ability to manage shocks. Caution in the use of foreign saving was war- 
ranted, Directors observed, and early action was required to reduce the 
current account deficit. While fiscal policy could play a role in the short 
term, over the medium tertm the emphasis should be on measures to in- 
crease private saving.” 
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Comment Frederic S. Mishkin 
The paper by Radelet and Sachs is a very useful discussion of the events 
in the East Asian financial crises. In my comment, I will present my own 
view of the East Asian crisis using an asymmetric information framework 
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